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FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES
I. INTRODUCTIONJULY 1, 1985, marked the tenth anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' This anniversary seems an appropriate oc-
sion upon which to measure the impact of those rules on the
law of evidence in the states and to comment on the form and
process of their adoption.
Ironically, the impetus and the sources for the Federal Rules
came from efforts originally designed to make uniform the state
law of evidence. The American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence, adopted in 1942,2 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, adopted in 1953,3 had been developed primarily to provide
model legislation for state adoption.4 By 1961, when the Judicial
Conference of the United States recommended the preliminary
study that was to lead in fourteen years to the adoption of the
Federal Rules,5 neither of those two earlier codes had been
adopted in any jurisdiction. The Model Code ultimately found no
takers, and the 1953 Uniform Rules were adopted only in Kansas,
(the home state of the drafting committee's chairman), New
Jersey, and Utah. 6
1. The bill adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. 5463, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973), was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on January 2,
1975. Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at
28 U.S.C. app. 678 (1982)). The Federal Rules became effective on January 1,
1975. Id. For a legislative history of the Federal Rules, see generally S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7051-52. See also infra note 19.
2. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), reprinted in I J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES,
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED Docu-
MENTS, Doc. 1 (1980).
3. UNIF. R. EviD. (1953), reprinted in 1J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, supra note 2,
Doc. 2.
4. For the antecedents and history of the 1942 Model Code and of the 1953
Uniform Rules, see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: EVIDENCE 77-92 (1977).
5. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1961 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 31 (1962). For a discussion of the initial stages in the history of the
Federal Rules, see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 92-100.
6. The chairman of the drafting committee was Spencer A. Gard of Iola,
Kansas. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 89. See also Gard, Kansas
Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence, 2 U. KAN. L. REV. 333 (1954). The
1953 Uniform Rules were adopted by Kansas in 1963. Revision of Code of Civil
Procedure, ch. 303, 1963 Kan. Sess. Laws 601 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-401 to -472 (1984)). NewJersey subsequently adopted the Uniform Rules
in 1967. Order, NJ. Supreme Ct. (June 6, 1967) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 1-32 (West 1984)). In Utah, after
initial rejection in 1959, the Uniform Rules were adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court in 1971. Order, Utah Supreme Ct. (Feb. 17, 1971). See UTAH R. EvID. 1-
74, 9B UTAH CODE ANN. (1977). California in 1965 adopted its own evidence
1985] 1317
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The effort to develop federal rules of evidence, beginning
with the 1962 Preliminary Study7 and the appointment of the Ad-
visory Committee in 1965,8 created an intense focal point for pro-
ponents of evidence codification and reform. The Advisory
Committee's Preliminary Draft9 and Revised Draft1 0 were the
subject of widespread informal and formal comment from the
practicing bar as well as the academic world,"' where overnight
these drafts superseded the Model Code and 1953 Uniform Rules
as teaching tools and research objects. In a number of states
where successful adaptation of the Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure made it a natural step, drafting projects to
prepare state rules on the federal model were under way even
before the Supreme Court's November 1972 promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 12 Indeed, Nevada's rules were
code, which was in some respects based on the 1953 Uniform Rules. Evidence
Code, ch. 299, 1964-1965 Cal. Stat. 1297 (codified at CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1-
1605 (West 1966 & Supp. 1985)). See UNIF. R. EVID. commissioners' prefatory
note (1974), 13 U.L.A. 209, 212-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Prefatory Note].
See generally 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 91-92.
7. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence, Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Devel-
oping Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73
(1962). See also 1 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, supra note 2, Doc. 4.
8. The Advisory Committee, appointed in March 1965, was composed of 15
judges, lawyers, and law professors. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
4, at 98-99.
9. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Draft]. See also 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 100-01; 2J. BAILEY &
0. TRELLES, supra note 2, Doc. 5.
10. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Revised Draft]. See also 2J.
BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, supra note 2, Doc. 6. A further revision of the Revised
Draft was transmitted to the Judicial Conference and approved by it for trans-
mittal to the Supreme Court in October, 1971. The revision was never pub-
lished officially. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 101-03.
11. See, e.g., Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24
ARK. L. REV. 401 (1971); McNichols, Some Random Thoughts on the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 187 (1970); Powell & Burns, Discussion of the
New Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1972); Proposed Rules of Evidence by
the United States District Courts and Magistrates--a Panel, 37 INS. COUNS. J. 565
(1970); Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique,
38 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1969); Symposium: Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1969
LAW & Soc. ORD. 509; Tone, The Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 CHI. B. REC. 307
(1973).
12. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Draft]. See also 2 J. BAILEY & 0. TREL-
LES, supra note 2, Doc. 7. On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court promul-
gated the Federal Rules of Evidence pursuant to the various enabling acts in the
United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1982). The Federal Rules
were to take effect on July 1, 1973. Supreme Court Draft, supra, at 184.
1318 [Vol. 30: p. 1315
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adopted in 197113 on the basis of the Preliminary Draft. 14 New
Mexico' 5 and Wisconsin, 16 in 1973 and 1974 respectively,
adopted rules based on the Supreme Court's 1972 promulga-
tion,17 undeterred by the fact that in the spring of 1973 Congress
had suspended the effective date of the Supreme Court's rules I8
and was actively engaged in the preparation of a legislative
version. 19
Congressional action brought only a temporary halt to state
efforts. In 1974, while Congress was still at work, the National
Conference had produced a new set of Uniform Rules20 based on
the federal model.2 ' Within three years after the 1975 enactment
of the Federal Rules in their final form, eleven more states had
13. Act of April 22, 1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nev. Stat. 775 (codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-56.020 (1979)).
14. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T-I (Supp. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
15. Order, New Mexico Supreme Ct. (April 26, 1973) (codified at N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4.101 to -4.1102 (1973) (amended 1976)). New Mexico subse-
quently amended its rules, effective April 1, 1976, to conform to the changes
made by Congress. See N.M. R. EVID. 101-1102.
16. Order, Wisconsin Supreme Ct. (April 16, 1973) (codified at Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West 1975 & Supp. 1985)).
17. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at T-1.
18. On February 5, 1973, ChiefJustice Warren Burger, acting pursuant to
the Supreme Court order of November 20, 1972, transmitted the proposed rules
to Congress. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7052. Congress responded by enacting a law to
insure that the legislators would have a "full opportunity" to review the pro-
posed rules. See Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
The law deferred the effectiveness of the Federal Rules until expressly approved
by Congress. Id. For a discussion of the circumstances occasioning the delay of
enactment, see infra note 124 and accompanying text. See also 21 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 104-07.
19. The legislative embodiment of the proposed rules, H.R. 5463, was re-
ported out by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee in November 1973, accompanied by House Report 93-650, and sent
on to the Senate with minor amendments in February 1974. A Senate version of
H.R. 5463, with substantial amendments, was reported out in October 1974,
accompanied by Senate Report 93-1277, and passed by the Senate in November.
The resulting Conference Report, Number 93-1597, was adopted by both
houses in December. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 107-08.
The bill eventually was signed into law. See supra note 1. The Judicial Confer-
ence noted that H.R. 5463 incorporated "some of the rules of evidence as pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court, together with many changes made by the House
of Representatives." PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1974 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 61 (1975) (emphasis added).
20. UNIF. R. EVID. (1974).
21. Prefatory Note, supra note 6, 13 U.L.A. at 212-13. The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws joined with the American Bar
Association in approving the new set of Uniform Rules, which supersede and
differ significantly from the 1953 Uniform Rules. 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 14, at T-3.
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adopted rules of evidence derived from either the Federal Rules
or the 1974 Uniform Rules, bringing the total number of "rules
states" to fourteen.2 2 In the seven succeeding years, sixteen
more states have followed the same lead, 23 with the most recent
adherent, New Hampshire, adopting rules of evidence on January
18, 1985, to be effectiveJuly 1, 1985.24 Thus, there are now thirty
rules states. In addition, the Federal Rules have been adopted in
Puerto Rico 25 and by federal executive order 26 for use in courts
martial. 27 Rules legislation or promulgation proposals are pend-
ing or under study in a number of other states at this time.2 8 Only
the high courts of Massachusetts 29 and Illinois30 have ultimately
declined to promulgate rules, although there have been delays
22. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rules 101-1103 (Supp.
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1979 & Supp.
1985); ME. R. EvID. 101-1102; MICH. R. Evii. 101-1102; MINN. R. EVID. 101-
1101; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rules 100-1008
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (1979); N.D.R. EVID. 101-1103;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 19-9-1 to -18-8 (1979); Wvo. R. EvID. 101-1104.
23. See ALASKA R. EvID. 101-1101; COLO. R. EvID. 101-1103; DEL. UNIF. R.
EVID. 101-1102; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-90.958 (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 100-1102 (Special Pamphlet 1980);
IDAHO R. EVID. 101-1103; IOWA R. EVID. 101-1103; N.H. R. EVID. 100-1103;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 101-1102 (1985); OHIO R.
EVID. 101-1103; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585 (1983); TEX. R. EVID. 101-
1008; UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; VT. R. EVID. 101-1103; WASH. R. EVID. 101-
1103; W. VA. R. EVID. 101-1102.
In addition to the states following the Federal Rules or the 1974 Uniform
Rules, Kansas and New Jersey currently still follow the 1953 Uniform Rules and
California retains its unique evidence code. See supra note 6.
24. Order, New Hampshire Supreme Ct. (effective July 1, 1985). See N.H. R.
EVID. 101-1103.
25. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, app. IV Rules of Evidence, Rules 1-84 (1983).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,198, amended by Exec. Order No. 12,233, 45 Fed.
Reg. 16,932 (1980).
27. MILITARY R. EVID. 101-1103.
28. New York, for example, is reviewing a Proposed Code of Evidence that
follows the present version of the Federal Rules. The Law Revision Commission
submitted its finally approved version to the New York legislature in 1982. 1
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at T-4. Other states, including NewJersey
and Rhode Island, have established committees to consider adopting the Fed-
eral Rules. Id.
29. Massachusetts developed a proposed set of rules but has thus far de-
clined to adopt them. The justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, in an announcement concerning the proposal, concluded that
"promulgation of rules of evidence would tend to restrict the development of
common law principles pertaining to the admissibility of evidence." Announce-
ment of Supreme Judicial Court Concerning Proposed Massachusetts Rules of
Evidence (Dec. 30, 1982), reprinted in 1982 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. Tables Mass-I
(Callaghan) (state correlation tables).
30. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5007 n.12.
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and problems in other states such as Vermont 3' and Ohio.3 2 The
Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1981 adopted a Uniform
Evidence Act3 3 with many similarities to the Federal Rules, and
codification is under study in Australia.3 4
The impact of the Federal Rules has gone beyond the states
where they have been adopted. In Vermont, between the 1977
publication of the Tentative Draft Rules of Evidence and the pro-
mulgation of the Vermont Rules in 1982, the Federal Rules or the
Tentative Draft were cited as authority in nearly thirty cases.3 5
The courts of Illinois,3 6 Kentucky,3 7 and Tennessee38 are among
those which have adopted specific provisions of the Federal Rules
as common-law articulations of the law of evidence. And the
SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts, in its order declining to
adopt proposed rules, invited parties to cite them in briefs and
memoranda.3 9
A principal purpose ascribed to the adoption of the Federal
Rules in the states has been the attainment of uniformity, both
between the federal and the state courts and among the states.
Part II of this paper assesses the degree of uniformity that has in
fact been attained in the past ten years and the value of that uni-
formity. As the federal experience illustrates, adoption of rules of
evidence raises issues of judicial and legislative power that have
31. See Foreword to VT. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, at xiii-xvii (1983).
32. For a discussion of the legislative battles fought over the adoption of
the Ohio Rules of Evidence, see Blakey, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of
Evidence, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 237, 241 (1980).
33. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL TASK FORCE ON UNIFORM EvI-
DENCE (Carswell 1982). The report was the basis for Bill S-33, the proposed
Canada Evidence Act, which is currently under consideration by the Canadian
Parliament. For a discussion of the Proposed Canada Evidence Act, see Paci-
occo, The Proposed Canada Evidence Act and the "Wray Formula ": Perpetuating an
Inadequate Discretion, 29 McGILL L.J. 141 (1983).
34. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN LAw REFORM COMM'N, ISSUES PAPER No. 3, RE-
FORM OF EVIDENCE LAw (1980); P. SALLMAN, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA 19
(1984).
35. See, e.g., State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 370, 438 A.2d 402, 405 (1981)
(citing FED. R. EvID. 401); State v. Roy, 140 Vt. 219, 226, 436 A.2d 1090, 1093
(1981) (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)). See also Foreword to VT. STAT. ANN.
Rules of Evidence, at xiv (1983).
36. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 193-96, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-
27 (adopting FED. R. EvID. 703, 705), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Crawley v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1978) (adopt-
ing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119.
38. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976) (adopting FED.
R. EvID. 609(a)).
39. Announcement of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Concern-
ing Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence, supra note 29. See Comment,
Evidence-Prior Criminal Conviction, 70 MASS. L. REV. 44, 44, n.1 1 (1985).
19851 1321
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on occasion led to conflict between the two branches of govern-
ment. Part III of the paper examines the respective merits of ju-
dicial and legislative adoption and reviews the issues of
constitutional power involved. Part IV offers rulemaking guide-
lines designed to eliminate conflict in states which have not yet
adopted rules of evidence.
II. UNIFORMITY
Uniformity in federal and state rules of evidence has two
main advantages: (1) it allows lawyers who practice in both state
and federal court, or who have clients in more than one state, to
master only one basic set of rules, and (2) it provides practitioners
and scholars alike ready access to a single nationwide body of au-
thority and commentary. 40 To be effective, however, uniformity
need not mean a literal and total uniformity of language and for-
mat among the states or between the states and the federal
courts.
The process of state adoption in fact has resulted in numer-
ous and wide variations on both levels. A quick survey of the ad-
mirable tabular summary of state rules in Weinstein's Evidence4'
indicates that in fifty of the seventy-seven rules originally promul-
gated by the Supreme Court in 1972, one or more of the states
has adopted a variation that is more than a minor technical word
change. A similar hasty scrutiny of the state correlation tables in
Callaghan & Company's Federal Rules of Evidence Service42 reveals
that only one of the twenty-eight states tabulated in the current
version has fewer than ten substantial variations from the Federal
Rules and most have many more.43
A. Reasons for State-Federal Variations
There are at least five reasons that have led to variation be-
tween the Federal Rules and state adaptations. The opportunity
for such variation is of course greatly enhanced and encouraged
because state rulemakers have before them in the various
Supreme Court and congressional drafts six published versions of
40. See McKusIcK, State Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for
Recognition, 36 ME. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (1984).
41. 1 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at T-1 to 246.
42. 1984 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) (state correlation tables).
43. The one state with fewer than ten substantial variations from the Fed-
eral Rules is Utah, with five. See UTAH R. EvID. 101-1103. Two states, Idaho and
West Virginia, are not yet included in the tables.
1322 [Vol. 30: p. 1315
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the Federal Rules, 44 as well as the 1974 Uniform Rules. Even
though most of the state rules purport to be based on the Federal
Rules as enacted by Congress in 1975, some avowedly are based
on earlier drafts or the Uniform Rules and there are many exam-
ples of individual state rules taken from one of the earlier ver-
sions. 45 Thus, a drafter might be lured into adopting one of the
types of variations discussed below by the availability of alterna-
tive models, or the drafter who sought to vary the federal model
for local reasons would find appropriate language readily at hand.
1. Minor Technical and Verbal Variations
Minor variations have a number of causes. Some variation
between federal and state tests is inevitable because of institu-
tional differences. Plainly, state rules must refer in appropriate
local terminology to the state constitution, laws, and court struc-
ture in provisions where the federal equivalents are mentioned.46
In addition, some state drafters, by preference or under legal
compulsion, have varied the federal model in the interest of em-
ploying gender-neutral language.47 Finally, every drafter knows
the feeling of wanting to "say it better." There are numerous var-
iations of language that can only be accounted for as instances of
intended stylistic improvement.48
2. Traditional State Practice
Many of the significant variations with the Federal Rules are
efforts by a state to preserve what is perceived as'a traditional
state practice-whether a theoretical concept such as the Morgan
theory of presumptions,49 or a rule of practice, such as the scope
of cross-examination.50
44. For citations to the six published versions, see supra notes 9, 10, 12 &
19.
45. Nevada's rules, for example, are based on the Preliminary Draft of the
Federal Rules. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-56.020 (1979). Arkansas' rules
are based on the 1974 Uniform Rules. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Rules 102-1102 (1979 & Supp. 1985). For examples of indi-
vidual rule variations, see ME. R. EVID. 406; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14-
21 to -14-23 (1979); VT. R. EvID. 601(a).
46. Compare ME. R. EvID. 402 with FED. R. EvID. 402.
47. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1985) with FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l),(2).
48. Compare VT. R. EvID. 406 with FED. R. EVID. 406.
49. Compare, e.g., DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 301 with FED. R. EvID. 301. For a
discussion of the theoretical issues, see infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
50. Compare, e.g., N.H. R. EvID. 611(b) with FED. R. EvID. 611(b).
1985] 1323
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3. Taking Sides
In some instances, states have declined to follow a controver-
sial provision of the Federal Rules, in effect taking sides in one of
the disputes that ran through the whole federal adoption pro-
cess. 5 1 Such state positions may be based either on prior state
practice or on a fresh look at the issues as illuminated in the fed-
eral debates.
4. A Plague on Both Houses
Some state variants reflect a rejection of all views offered on
controversial points in the federal debates in favor of a traditional
state rule, an original solution to the problem, or in some cases
silence.52
5. Breaking New Ground
Some state rules depart from the Federal Rules in addressing
areas the federal drafters did not address, such as judicial notice
of law, 53 res ipsa loquitur, 54 allocation of burdens, 55 or new rules
of privilege. 56
B. A Survey of State Variations
This section provides a nonexhaustive listing of some of the
principal areas of difference between the Federal Rules and those
adopted in the states.
1. Rule 201: Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
Federal rule 201(g)5 7 provides that in civil actions the jury is
to be instructed to accept judicially noticed facts as conclusive,
while in criminal cases the jury is to be instructed "that it may, but
is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially no-
ticed."58 This provision was a major departure from the rule as
promulgated by the Supreme Court, under which facts judicially
51. Compare, e.g., ME. R. EVID. 201 (g) with FED. R. EvID. 201 (g). See also infra
text accompanying notes 57-60.
52. Compare, e.g., VT. R. EVID. 301; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 302 (Special Pamphlet 1980); and WASH. R. EvID. 301 comment with
FED. R. EvID. 301.
53. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
54. See DEL. UNF. R. EVID. 304.
55. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.105-40.115 (1985).
56. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. EVID. 201(g).
58. Id.
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noticed were to be accepted as conclusive in either type of ac-
tion. 59 The change was based on a concern that, like the direction
of a verdict against the accused, a mandatory instruction on judi-
cial notice would invade the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial. 60
Nineteen of the thirty rules states follow the enacted federal
rule on this point,6 1 while eight states follow the Supreme Court's
version. 62 Two states have not adopted any version of rule 201 (g)
on the ground that their state constitutions prohibit instructing
the jury on matters of fact.63 The remaining state has adopted a
variant version because its evidence code does not apply in crimi-
nal actions. 64 A majority of the states has thus followed the fed-
eral rule along a path that ignores the traditional purpose and
meaning of judicial notice in favor of a policy of deference to the
constitutional right to jury trial.
Federal rule 201 contains no provision for judicial notice of
law. The Advisory Committee's note indicates that this subject
was to be left to the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil and Criminal Procedure. 65 Twelve states, either because
they lacked such procedural rules or out of a desire to group like
things with like, have adopted a separate evidence rule covering
59. Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 201.
60. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7055, 7080. The House Committee on the Judiciary
considered that the rule as promulgated by the Supreme Court, requiring
mandatory instruction to the jury in a criminal case to accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed, was "inappropriate because contrary to the spirit of the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial." Id.
61. See ALASKA R. EVID. 203(c); CoLo. R. EVID. 201(g); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(g) (Special Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R.
EVID. 201(g); IOWA R. EVID. 201(g); MICH. R. EvID. 201(f); MINN. R. EVID.
201(g); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(g) (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-201(7) (1979); N.H. R. EvID. 201(g); N.M. R. EVID. 201(g);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 201(g) (1980); OHIO R. EVID.
201(g); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2202(E) (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.085
(1985); UTAH R. EVID. 201(g); VT. R. EvID. 201(g); W. VA. R. EVID. 201(g); Wvo.
R. EVID. 201(g).
62. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(g) (Supp. 1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(g) (1979);
DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 201(g); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.206 (West Supp. 1985); ME. R.
EVID. 201(g); N.D. R. EvID. 201(g); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-10-7 (1979);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 902.01(7) (West 1975).
63. See WASH. R. EVID. 201 commentary (citing WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
Hensen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975)). See also NEV.
REV. STAT. § 47.020 legislative subcommittee comment (1979) (citing NEV.
CONST. art. 6, § 12).
64. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 3713 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
65. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee note on judicial notice of law.
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judicial notice of law. 66
2. Rules 301-303: Presumptions
Congress made substantial changes in the presumption pro-
visions of the Supreme Court's 1972 promulgation. Rule 301 as
enacted adopted a variant of the so-called Thayer Rule, or "burst-
ing bubble" theory, 67 imposing only the burden of going forward
with the evidence upon the party burdened by a presumption. In
contrast, the Supreme Court's rule 301 had adopted the Morgan
Rule, imposing the burden of persuasion upon the burdened
party.68 The congressional change was based on the view that the
Morgan Rule gave too great an effect to most presumptions,
which only have the purpose of aiding the trial process by shifting
the burden of going forward to the party who has the best access
to the facts or the notably less probable side of a common ques-
tion. 69 The 1974 Uniform Rules followed the Supreme Court in
66. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 202 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.201 (West
Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 202 (Special
Pamphlet 1980); MICH. R. EVID. 202; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of
Evidence, Rule 202 (1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.140 (1979); N.H. R. EVID.
201(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2201 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.085
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 902.02-.03 (West 1979); TEX. R. EvID. 202-203; W.
VA. R. EvID. 202.
67. The bursting bubble theory, first propounded by ProfessorJames Brad-
ley Thayer in 1898, postulates that the only effect of a presumption is to shift the
burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed fact. If the evidence
is produced by the adversary, the presumption is spent and disappears. For a
more detailed explanation of the theory, see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 344(A) (3d E. Cleary ed. 1984). See also J.B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ch. 8 passim (1898).
68. For a more detailed discussion of the Morgan rule, named after Profes-
sor Edmund Morgan, one of its leading proponents, see Morgan & Maguire,
Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937). See
also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 344(B).
69. The House Judiciary Committee agreed with the judgment implicit in
the Supreme Court's version that the bursting bubble theory gives presumptions
too slight an effect. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7080-81. On the other hand, the
committee believed that the rule proposed by the Supreme Court, whereby a
presumption permanently alters the burden of persuasion, no matter how much
contradicting evidence is introduced, "lends too great a force to presumptions."
Id. Accordingly, the committee amended the rule to adopt an intermediate posi-
tion under which a presumption does not vanish upon the introduction of con-
tradicting evidence, and does not change the burden of persuasion. Instead "it
is merely deemed sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be considered by
the jury or other finder of fact." Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected
the "presumption as evidence" approach and left the rule simply as one that
followed the Thayer rule in shifting only the burden of production. See S. REP.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7056. The Senate version was adopted by the Senate-House Conference
1326
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/4
1985] FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES 1327
adopting the Morgan Rule.
Twelve of the thirty rules states have followed the enacted
rule 301 in adopting the Thayer presumption. 70 Eleven states
have followed the Supreme Court or uniform rule in incorporat-
ing a Morgan presumption in their rule 301.71 Three have
adopted rules in which the effect given to the presumption de-
pends upon the type and purpose of the presumption. 72 Three
states adopted no rule concerning the effect of presumptions, 73
and Iowa adopted a presumption rule expressly leaving in effect
existing law.74
Federal rule 30275 is a choice-of-law rule providing that in
civil actions state law governs the effect of a presumption when
state law governs the issue to which the presumed fact is relevant.
The 1974 uniform rule 30276 provides the converse rule for fed-
eral claims in state court. Only eight states have adopted the uni-
Committee and enacted. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7099.
70. See ALASKA R. EVID. 301; COLO. R. EVID. 301; IDAHO R. EVID. 301; MICH.
R. EvID. 301; MINN. R. EVID. 301; OHIo R. EvID. 301; N.H. R. EVID. 301; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 (1985); N.M. R. EVID. 301; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-11-1 (1979); VT. R. EVID. 301; W. VA. R. EvID. 301.
71. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 301
(1979); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 301; ME. R. EvID. 301; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch.
10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-301 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 47.180 (1979); N.D. R. EVID. 301; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585
(1985); UTAH R. EVID. 301; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (West 1975); Wyo. R.
EVID. 301. The Montana rule goes a step farther in providing specifically that a
presumption is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. See MONT. CODE
ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 (1985).
72. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.302 (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 626, Rules of Evidence, Rule 302 (Special Pamphlet 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2303 (West 1980). The Florida and Hawaii provisions are based upon
§ 603 and § 605 of the California Evidence Code. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 603,
605 (West 1966). The Oklahoma rule is based on rule 14 of the 1953 Uniform
Rules, adoption of which Judge Weinstein has criticized as "a draftsman's er-
ror." 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 301-77.
73. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence (Supp. 1985); TEX. R. EVID.
101-1008; WASH. R. EVID. 101-1103.
74. IOWA R. EVID. 301. The Iowa rule provides, "Nothing in these rules
shall be deemed to modify or supersede existing law relating to presumptions in
civil actions and proceedings." Id.
75. FED. R. EVID. 302. The rule was intended to reflect the impact of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in the area of presumptions. See FED. R.
EVID. 302 advisory committee note (citing Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 437 (1959); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v.
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939)). For the view that policy rather than constitu-
tional considerations dictated this choice, see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 4, § 5132.
76. UNIF. R. EVID. 302 (1974).
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form rule.77  The remaining twenty-two states have no
comparable rule.
Two states have added unique provisions concerning specific
presumptions. Maine, for example, has added its own rule 302
setting forth the presumption of legitimacy, which imposes a bur-
den of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt upon the party as-
serting illegitimacy. 78 Delaware also has added a rule 304,
codifying the law of res ipsa loquitur. 79 Two other states have
incorporated lengthy lists of presumptions in their rules.80
Congress did not adopt the Supreme Court's rule 303 cover-
ing presumptions in criminal cases. The intention was to leave
the subject to resolution in then-pending legislation to revise the
federal criminal code.8 1 The 1974 uniform rule 30382 is virtually
identical to the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. Fifteen
states have adopted the Supreme Court/uniform rule 303 either
verbatim or in effect.8 3 Twelve states have adopted no provision
77. See ALAsKA R. EvID. 302; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 302 (1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 302 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-302 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 302
(1985); N.D. R. EVID. 302; UTAH R. EVID. 302; Wyo. R. EvID. 302.
78. ME. R. EVID. 302. The Maine rule provides:
Whenever it is established in an action that a child was born to or con-
ceived by a woman while she was lawfully married, the party asserting
the illegitimacy of the child has the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuading the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of
such illegitimacy.
Id. The Maine advisors' note explains: "Federal Rule 302 deals with the effect
of a presumption ina case where state law supplies the rule of decision, typically
a diversity of citizenship case. It obviously has no place in a state code of evi-
dence." Id. advisors' note.
79. DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 304 (1981).
80. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 303, 304 (Special
Pamphlet 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585 (1985). The Hawaii provi-
sions are based on §§ 630-669 of the California Evidence Code. See CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 630-669 (West 1966). The Oregon provision is similar to the Califor-
nia Code but does not follow it in distinguishing between the Thayer and Mor-
gan presumptions.
81. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079. Judge Weinstein, in considering the fail-
ure of Congress to adopt a revised criminal code, has urged that a rule
equivalent to the Supreme Court's rule 303 be promulgated. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 303[03] (citing Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at
212 (rule 303)).
82. UNIF. R. EVID. 303 (1974).
83. See ALAsKA R. EvID. 303; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of
Evidence Rule 303 (1979); ME. R. EVID. 303; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules
of Evidence, Rule 306 (Special Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R. EvID. 302; MICH. R.
EvID. 302; N.M. R. EVID. 303; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-303 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 47-230 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2304 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
14
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covering presumptions in criminal cases. 84 Two states have
adopted rules incorporating by reference statutory provisions
concerning criminal presumptions.85
3. Rule 404: Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;
Exceptions; Other Crimes
Federal rule 40486 was enacted by Congress in substantially
the form of the Supreme Court promulgation. The 1974 uniform
rule is identical.
Because of growing concern for the problems caused by ad-
mission of evidence about a rape victim's prior sexual conduct in
rape prosecutions, 87 Congress amended the Federal Rules in
197888 by adding rule 412,89 which prohibits reputation or opin-
ion evidence of past sexual behavior and imposes significant pro-
cedural and other limitations on the admission of other evidence
of such behavior. There is no equivalent to rule 412 in the 1974
Uniform Rules.
Twenty of the thirty rules states have adopted federal rule
404 either verbatim or with only minor modifications. 90 The re-
maining ten states have adopted the basic plan of the federal rule
with a more substantial change, 91 with five of the states having
§ 40.125 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-1 1-2 to -4 (1979); VT. R. EVID.
303; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.03 (West 1975); Wyo. R. EvID. 303.
84. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rules 101-1103
(Supp. 1985); COLO. R. EvID. 101-1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West
Supp. 1985); MINN. R. EvID. 101-1101; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of
Evidence, Rules 100-1008 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence,
Rules 101-1102 (1985); N.H. R. EVID. 100-1103; OHIO R. EvID. 101-1103; TEX.
R. EvID. 101-1103; UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; WASH. R. EvID. 101-1103; W. VA.
R. EvID. 101-1102.
85. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 303; N.D. R. EvID. 303.
86. FED. R. EVID. 404.
87. The level of concern may be discerned from the debates in Congress
preceding the enactment of rule 412. See 124 CONG. REC. H34912-13 (1978)
(House debates); 124 CONG. REC. S36256 (1978) (Senate debates).
88. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540,
92 Stat. 2046 (1978). The amendment added rule 412 to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
89. FED. R. EVID. 412.
90. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (Supp. 1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (1979); COLO.
R. EvID. 404; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 404; FLA. STAT. ANN., § 90.404 (West 1979);
IDAHO R. EvID. 404; MICH. R. EVID. 404; MINN. R. EVID. 404; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-404 (1979); N.H. R. EvID. 404; N.M. R. EvID. 404; N.D. R. EvID. 404; OHIO
R. EvID. 404; S. D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 19-12-4 to -5 (1979); UTAH R. EVID.
404; VT. R. EvID. 404; WASH. R. EvID. 404; W. VA. R. EvID. 404; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.04 (West 1975); Wvo. R. EvID. 404.
91. See ALASKA R. EvID. 404 (substitutes "relevant" for "pertinent" in sub-
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added language expressly limiting the use of evidence of prior
sexual behavior in rape cases. 92 In addition, eight states have
adopted a separate rule similar to federal rule 412, 9 3 and two
states have provided an in limine procedure as a prerequisite for
admission of some or all evidence of prior crimes. 94
4. Rule 405: Methods of Proving Character
Federal rule 40595 was enacted in the form promulgated by
the Supreme Court in 1972. The original House bill would have
eliminated proof of character by opinion testimony from rule
405(a), 96 but the provision was restored before the bill passed the
House. The 1974 uniform rule is identical. 97
Seventeen states have adopted rules identical to the enacted
sections (a)(1) and (2)); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 404
(Special Pamphlet 1980) (refers to rule on bias, etc., in subsection (a)(3) and
includes "modus operandi" in subsection (b)); IOWA R. EvID. 404 (makes sub-
section (a)(3) applicable in civil cases and in criminal cases where victim is un-
available); ME. R. EvID. 404 (eliminates subsection (a)(2)); MONT. CODE ANN. tit.
26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (1985) (makes subsection (a)(2) applica-
ble in assault cases where victim is unavailable and adds subsection (c) covering
character in issue); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.045 (1979) (character as well as trait
evidence admissible in equivalents of subsections (a)(1) and (2)); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (1985) (adds "entrapment" in subsec-
tion (b)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2404 (1980) (omits "wrongs" in subsection
(b)); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170 (1985) (covers character in issue, broadens use of
victim traits, and permits use of aggressor traits in civil action); TEX. R. EvID.
404 (permits evidence of traits relevant to moral turpitude or violence in civil
cases).
92. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404; MiCH. R. EVID. 404; MINN. R. EvID. 404; OHIO
R. EVID. 404; W. VA. R. EVID. 404. It should be noted that, in at least five other
states, advisory comments or notes to rule 404 state that the rule should be
interpreted to impose a similar limitation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of
Evidence, Rule 404 (Supp. 1985); DEL UNIF. R. EVID. 404; UTAH R. EvID. 404;
WASH. R. EVID. 404; Wyo. R. EVID. 404.
93. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 412 (Special
Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R. EVID., 412; IOWA R. EVID. 412; NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 48.069 (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 412; N.M. R. EvID. 413; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1,
Rules of Evidence, Rule 412 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210 (1985).
94. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404 (court order); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404 (West
Supp. 1985) (notice). Vermont has incorporated a procedure similar to that of
Florida. See VT. R. CRIM. P. 26(c). Similar action also was recommended in
Delaware. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 404 advisory comment. See generally Im-
winkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465 (1985).
95. FED. R. EvID. 405.
96. House Judiciary Committee members feared that wholesale allowance
of opinion testimony might tend to turn a trial into "a swearing contest between
conflicting character witnesses." See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7081.
97. See UNIF. R. EvID. 405 (1974).
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federal rule.98 Eight states have adopted the rule with a variety of
clarifying changes,9 9 including (1) the addition of the words, "in
any community or group in which the individual habitually associ-
ated," after "reputation" in subdivision (a); 00 (2) the addition of
the words, "or where the character of the victim relates to the
reasonableness of force used by the accused in self-defense," in
subdivision (b);10 1 and (3) a sentence in subdivision (a) prohibit-
ing expert testimony on character relating to commission of the
act charged. 02 Five states have followed their prior law in elimi-
nating proof of character by opinion evidence. 0 3
5. Rule 406.: Habit; Routine Practice
When Congress enacted rule 406,104 it enacted only subdivi-
sion (a) of the Supreme Court's rule 406.105 In the belief that the
method of proof should be left to case-by-case development,
Congress deleted subdivision (b), providing for proof of habit or
routine practice by opinion testimony or specific instances of con-
duct. 106 The omitted subdivision was incorporated in the 1974
uniform rule.10 7
Twenty-two states 0 8 have adopted federal rule 406 either
98. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (Supp. 1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (1979); HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (Special Pamphlet 1980);
IDAHO R. EVID. 405; IOWA R. EVID. 405; ME. R. EVID. 405; MINN. R. EVID. 405;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-405 (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 405; N.M. R. EvID. 405; N.D. R.
EVID. 405; OHIO R. EvID. 405; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-12-6 to -7 (1979);
TEX. R. EVID. 405; W. VA. R. EVID. 405; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.05 (West 1975);
UTAH R. EvID. 405.
99. See ALASKA R. EVID. 405; COLO. R. EVID. 405; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.055 (1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2405 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585 (1985); COLO. R.
EvID. 405; Wyo. R. EVID. 405.
100. See ALASKA R. EVID. 405.
101. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of evidence, Rule 405
(1985).
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 405(a) (1985).
103. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 405; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.405 (West Supp.
1985); MIcH. R. EVID. 405; VT. R. EVID. 405; WASH. R. EVID. 405.
104. FED. R. EvID. 406.
105. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 223 (rule 406).
106. The deletion was suggested by the House Special Subcommittee on
the Judiciary. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079.
107. See UNIF. R. EVID. 406 (1974).
108. See ALASKA R. EvID. 406; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 406 (Supp. 1985); CoLo. R. EVID. 406; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 406; HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 406 (Special Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO
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verbatim or with minor stylistic change. One state has limited the
rule to routine practice of organizations. I° 9 Two of the states 10
have added language defining "habit" and "routine practice."
Only seven states" I' have adopted uniform rule 406(b).
6. Rule 407: Subsequent Remedial Measures
Federal rule 4071 12 is identical to the rule as promulgated by
the Supreme Court 1 3 and to the 1974 uniform rule 407.114
Nineteen states' 15 have adopted rule 407 in a form substan-
tially identical to the federal/uniform rule, and five other states 116
have adopted a similar version with only minor variations. One
state has expressly included products liability cases in the rule's
definition of "negligence or culpable conduct".' 17 Four states" 18
specifically except "product liability" or "strict liability" cases
from the exclusionary effect of the rule by express language or
R. EviD. 406; IOWA R. EviD. 406; MIcH. R. EvID. 406; MINN. R. Evm. 406; N.H.
R. EviD. 406; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 406 (1985); N.D.
R. EviD. 406; OHIO R. EviD. 406; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2406 (West 1980);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-8
(1979); TEX. R. EVID. 406; UTAH R. EVID. 406; VT. R. EvID. 406; WASH. R. EVID.
406; W. VA. R. EVID. 406; Wyo. R. Evid. 406.
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.406 (West Supp. 1985).
110. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 406
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.180 (1985).
111. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
406(b) (1979); ME. R. EvID. 406(b); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of
Evidence, Rule 406(c) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-406(2) (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 48.059(2) (1979); N.M. R. EvID. 406(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.06(2)
(West 1975).
112. FED. R. EvID. 407.
113. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 225 (rule 407).
114. UNIF. R. EvID. 407 (1974).
115. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 (1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 (1979); COLO. R.
EVID. 407; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 407; IDAHO R. EVID. 407; MICH. R. EvID. 407;
MINN. R. EVID. 407; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule
407 (1985); N.H. R. EviD. 407; N.M. R. EVID. 407; N.D. R. EvID. 407; OHIO R.
EVID. 407; OR. REV. STAT. §,40.185 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 19-12-9
(1979); UTAH R. EVID. 407; VT. R. EVID. 407; WASH. R. EVID. 407; W. VA. R.
EVID. 407; Wyo. R. EVID. 407.
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.407 (West Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 48.095 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2407 (West 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West
1975).
117. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (1979).
118. See ALAsKA R. EVID. 407; HAWAII REV. STAT. 626-1, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 407 (Special Pamphlet 1980); IOWA R. EVID. 407; TEX. R. EVID. 407. It
should be noted that in two states the advisory note or comment calls for an
interpretation of the rule to except such cases. See COLO. R. EvID. 407 commit-
tee comment; Wyo. R. EVID. 407 committee note.
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interpretation. Maine stands alone in having adopted a version of
rule 407 that is exactly opposite in its effect to the federal rule." 19
Subdivision (a) of the Maine rule makes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures expressly admissible. 120 The Maine rule also
adds a subdivision (b), which expressly makes a manufacturer's
written defect notification admissible against the manufacturer on
the issue of existence of the defect in a products liability suit. 1 2 1
7. Rules 501-513: Privileges
The Supreme Court in its 1972 promulgation included rules
501-513,122 setting forth nine separate evidentiary privileges for
various forms of confidential communication, together with a
general rule confining privileges to the Federal Rules and consti-
tutional and federal statutory exemptions, as well as three rules
covering procedural aspects of the assertion of privilege. Con-
gress declined to enact these rules, substituting for them a single
rule 501123 providing that evidentiary privileges, except as the
Constitution, federal statutes, and other Supreme Court rules
might provide, were to "be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience."' 124 The rule
also provided that, in civil actions where state substantive law ap-
plied, privileges were controlled by state law. 125 The basic pur-
poses of the change were to avoid contravening the common law
by evidentiary rule and to respect state policy in areas where state
119. See ME. R. EVID. 407.
120. See ME. R. EVID. 407(a). The advisors' note to Maine rule 407 recog-
nizes subdivision (a) as adopted to be "directly contrary to Maine law" but calls
the assumption that denying admissibility would deter repairs "unpersuasive to-
day." ME. R. EVID. 407(a) advisors' note (citing Carleton v. Rockland St. Ry.,
110 Me. 397, 86 A. 334 (1913)). See also Comment, The Repair Rule: Maine Rule of
Evidence 407(a) and the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negli-
gence, 27 ME. L. REV. 225 (1975).
121. ME. R. EvID. 407(b). See also TEX. R. EvID. 407(b) (including an identi-
cal provision).
122. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 230-61 (rules 501-513).
123. FED. R. EVID. 501.
124. According to Judge Weinstein, federal rule 501 as enacted by Con-
gress "differs radically in approach from the view on privileges expressed by the
Advisory Committee." 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 510[011.
Judge Weinstein suggests that it was the acrimonious debate in Congress over
the privileges article submitted by the Court that delayed the enactment of the
rules for so long. Id. See also 120 CONG. REC. H40891 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Hungate) ("Without doubt, the privilege section of the rules of evidence gener-
ated more comment or controversy than any other section.").
125. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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law governs. 126 The 1974 Uniform Rules contain rules 501-512127
covering the same ground as the Supreme Court's rules, with the
omission of Supreme Court rule 502, covering required reports
privileged by statute.
Eleven states have followed the federal lead,' 28 adopting fed-
eral rule 501 or some variant and adopting no specific rules of
privilege. Montana has adopted only those rules covering the in-
former's privilege and the procedural provisions. 129 The remain-
ing eighteen states have adopted a variety of privileges based on
the Supreme Court and Uniform Rules. Of these eighteen states,
seven states' 30 follow the Uniform Rules with more or less fidel-
ity; seven states 13 1 follow the Supreme Court rules with somewhat
less fidelity; and the remaining four states 3 2 present too varied a
pattern to summarize. In one area of recent widespread concern,
six of the eighteen privilege-rules states followed Supreme Court
rule 503(a),' 33 omitting a definition of "representative of the cli-
ent" and leaving to case law the question of which corporate em-
ployee communications are privileged. Twelve states 134 have
126. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7075, 7082-83. For a critical analysis of the theoretical bases of rule 501, see 23
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5422.
127. UNIF. R. EVID. 501-512 (1974).
128. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 501 (Supp. 1985);
COLO. R. EVID. 501; IOWA R. EVID. 501; MicH. R. EvID. 501 (1978); MINN. R.
EVID. 501; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 501 (1985); OHIO R.
EVID. 501; UTAH R. EVID. 501; WASH. R. EVID. 501; W. VA. R. EVID. 501; Wyo. R.
EVID. 501.
129. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rules 502-505
(1985). The Montana rules are based on rules 509-512 of the 1974 Uniform
Rules. See UNIF. R. EvID. 509-512 (1974).
130. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 501-
502 (1979); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 501-513; IDAHO R. EVID. 501-520; ME. R. EVID.
501-513; N.D. R. EVID. 501-512; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2501-2513 (West
1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-1 to -30 (1979).
131. See ALASKA R. EVID. 501-512; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.501-.510 (West
Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 501-513
(Special Pamphlet 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-501 to -513 (1979); N.M. R.
EVID. 501-514; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.225-40.295 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 905.01-.13 (West 1975).
132. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.015-405 (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 501-512;
TEX. R. EVID. 501-513; VT. R. EVID. 501-512.
133. Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 237 (rule 503(a)). See DEL. UNIF.
R. EVID. 503(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-503(a) (1979); N.M. R. EVID. 503(a); VT. R. EVID. 503(a); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.03 (West 1975).
134. See ALASKA R. EVID. 503(a)(2); ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289-1001, Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of
Evidence, Rule 503(a)(2) (Special Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R. EVID. 502(a)(2);
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followed uniform rule 502(a)(2) and the 1969 and 1971 drafts of
federal rule 503(a) 135 in defining "representative of the client" to
incorporate the "control group" test, limiting the privilege to
persons having authority to seek and act upon legal advice for the
client. 136
Nine of the rules states 137 have adopted additional rules of
privilege not found in either the Uniform or Supreme Court
rules. Protected relationships include accountant-client, 3 8 re-
porter-source, 139 school employee-pupil, 40 social worker-cli-
ent,141 nurse-patient,142 interpreter-hearing impaired person,143
stenographer-employee, 144 medical review panel, 145 parent-
child 146 and lie detector technician-subject. 147 Hawaii has even
ME. R. EVID. 503(a)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.075 (1979); N.H. R. EVID.
503(a)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 503(a)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503(a)(2) (West
1980); 0. REV. STAT. § 40.225 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-2
(1979); TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(2). Note that Idaho rule 502(a)(2) goes a step be-
yond the "control group" test to include also "an employee of the client who is
authorized to communicate information obtained in the course of employment
to the attorney of the client." IDAHO R. EvID. 502(a)(2).
135. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2) (1974); Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, at
249 (rule 503(a)(2)); Revised Draft, supra note 10, at 361 (rule 503(a)(2)).
136. The Supreme Court in 1981 rejected the "control group" test, thus
leaving the issue to case-by-case development as the Supreme Court's draft of
rule 503(a) would have done. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). Upjohn suggests a more functional approach, previously adopted in
lower court decisions, which would focus on the relation of the communication
to the employee's duties, rather than on his or her level within the corporate
hierarchy. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 64, §§ 87, 96. See also Saltzburg, Cor-
porate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 279 (1984); Salminen, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Control Group Test in Maine Rule 502 (Dec. 1985) (unpublished independent
writing project, University of Maine School of Law).
137. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 501-513 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 33, ch.
626, Rules of Evidence, Rules 501-513 (1981); IDAHO R. EVID. 501-520; NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 49.015-.405 (1979); N.M. R. EVID. 501-514; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 §§ 2501-2513 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. tit. 4, ch. 40 §§ 40.225-40.295 (1983);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 905.01-.13 (1975).
138. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.125-.205 (1979). See also IDAHO R. EVID.
515.
139. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
513; NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1979).
140. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.290 (1979) (counselor-pupil); id. § 49.291
(teacher-pupil); IDAHO R. EVID. 516; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.245 (1985).
141. See N.M. R. EVID. 509; IDAHO R. EVID. 518; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250
(1985).
142. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.240 (1985).
143. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.015 (West Supp. 1985).
144. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.265 (1985).
145. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1979); IDAHO R. EVID. 519-520.
146. See IDAHO R. EVID. 514.
147. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.065 (West Supp. 1985).
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incorporated the privilege against self-incrimination into its
rules. 148
8. Rule 601: General Rule of Competency
Congress enacted the Supreme Court's rule as the first sen-
tence of rule 601,149 providing that "[e]very person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."' 50
Congress then added a sentence saving state law competency pro-
visions where state substantive law supplies the rule of decision.
This provision was adopted in deference to state policy asserted
to lie behind such provisions as "dead man's statutes."' 51 The
1974 uniform rule 601,152 following the Supreme Court rule, con-
tains only the first sentence.
Nineteen states 53 have adopted the first sentence of the en-
acted federal rule verbatim, or in similar language, thus by impli-
cation repealing the dead man's statute and any other common-
law statutory competency provisions. In addition, Minnesota1
54
148. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 509 (Special Pam-
phlet 1980).
149. FED. R. EVID. 601 (incorporating Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at
261, (rule 601)).
150. Id.
151. See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee note. Dead man's statutes
were enacted in many states to prevent an interested party from testifying as to
transactions with a person since deceased in a suit prosecuted or defended by
the executor or administrator of the decedent. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note
67, § 68. While acknowledging substantial disagreement over the merit of the
dead man's statutes, the House Judiciary Committee nevertheless felt they
should not be overturned, in that they reflect state policy concerns. See H.R.
REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7075, 7083. For a strong criticism of both dead man's statutes and Con-
gress' decision to defer to state law in federal rule 601, see Schmertz, The First
Decade Under Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Some Suggested Amendments to
Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1367, 1376-405 (1985).
152. UNIF. R. EvID. 601 (1974).
153. See ALASKA R. EVID. 601; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of
Evidence, Rule 601 (1979); DEL. UNIT. R. EvID. 601; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1,
Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 (Special Pamphlet 1980); IOWA R. EVID. 601; ME. R.
EvID. 601; MICH. R. EVID. 601; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 601 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-601 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 50.015 (1979); N.M. R. EVID. 601; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 601 (1985); N.D. R. EVID. 601; OHIO R. EVID. 601; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2601 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 19-14-1 (1979); UTAH R. EvID. 601; Wyo. R. EvID. 601. The Utah rule also
contains an express repeal of Utah's dead man's statute. See UTAH R. EVID.
601(c). However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that the Wyoming
rule is ineffective to supersede the statute. See Consolidated Constr., Inc. v.
Smith, 634 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1981).
154. See MINN. R. EVID. 616.
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expressly repealed the dead man's statute, although Minnesota's
rule otherwise leaves competency to prior law.' 55 Eight states 56
have incorporated the phrase "by statute" or similar language in
the first sentence, implicitly preserving the dead man's statute
and other competency provisions. Four states 57 have adopted a
specific provision containing or expressly saving a dead man's
statute. Ten states 58 have incorporated a list of specific disquali-
fications as exceptions to the general rule of competency of rule
601 (a).
9. Rule 608: Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
In enacting rule 608,159 Congress enacted the rule adopted
by the Supreme Court' 60 with a change in rule 608(b) intended to
increase court discretion in allowing into evidence specific in-
stances of character to attack credibility. 161 The 1974 uniform
rule is identical to the enacted federal rule. 162
Nineteen states 163 have followed the federal rule verbatim or
155. MINN. R. EVID. 601.
156. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 (Supp. 1985);
CoLo. R. EvID. 601; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. R. EVID.
601; N.H. R. EvID. 601; VT. R. EvID. 601; WASH. R. EVID. 601; W. VA. R. EVID.
601. Minnesota, however, expressly repealed the dead man's statute. See supra
notes 154-55 and accompanying text. New Hampshire had previously repealed
the statute. See infra note 257.
157. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.602 (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO R. EVID.
601(b); TEX. R. EVID. 601(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.01 (West 1975).
158. See ALASKA R. EVID. 601; IDAHO R. EVID. 601; ME. R. EvID. 601; MICH.
R. EVID. 601; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 601
(1985); N.H. R. EVID. 601; OHIO R. EVID. 601; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310 (1985);
TEx. R. EVID. 601; VT. R. EVID. 601.
159. FED. R. EVID. 608.
160. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 267-69 (rule 608).
161. Rule 608(b), as submitted by the Supreme Court, permitted specific
instances of misconduct by a witness to be addressed on cross-examination for
the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility, as long as the questions were
probative of the witness' truthfulness or untruthfulness, and the acts were not
"remote in time." See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7084. The amended rule emphasized
the discretionary power of the court in permitting such testimony, and deleted
the reference to remoteness in time as unnecessary and confusing. See id.
162. See UNIF. R. EVID. 608 (1974).
163. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 (Supp. 1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 (1979); COLO.
R. EVID. 608; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 (Special
Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R. EvID. 608; IOWA R. EVID. 608; ME. R. EVID. 608;
MINN. R. EVID. 608; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608 (1979); N.M. R. EvID. 608; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 (1985); N.D. R. EVID. 608; OHIO
R. EVID. 608; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2608 (West 1980); N.H. R. EVID. 608;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14-9 to -10 (1979); VT. R. EVID. 608; W. VA. R.
EVID. 608; Wyo. R. EVID. 608.
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with minor variations. Four states, 16 4 each of which eliminated
opinion evidence from rule 405(b), have consistently followed
that course in rule 608(a). Vermont, 165 however, has eliminated
opinion evidence from rule 405(b) but permitted it in rule 608(a),
following the pattern of its case law. Three states 166 do not allow
specific instances of conduct to attack credibility. Four states'
67
have other variations, including adoption of the 1969 Preliminary
Draft, adoption of the Supreme Court rule, and addition of a pro-
vision covering impeachment by evidence of bias.
10. Rule 609: Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction for Crime
When Congress enacted Rule 609,168 it made numerous
amendments to the Supreme Court rule. Principal changes were
(1) a provision that convictions must be proved by the admission
of the accused or by public record on cross examination; 169 (2) in-
corporation of an express requirement that the court weigh pro-
bative value against prejudice in admitting evidence of either a
conviction of a crime not involving dishonesty that is punishable
by sentence of one year or more,' 70 or a conviction more than ten
years old; 17 1 and (3) a requirement of notice for use of evidence
of a conviction which is more than ten years old. 172 The 1974
uniform rule follows the enacted rule, except that the provision
for bringing out the conviction on cross examination is omitted
from rule 608(a) and the balancing requirement is omitted from
rule 608(b).173
There is considerable variation in state adoption of rule 609.
Seven states 174 have adopted the federal rule, either verbatim or
164. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 608(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608 (West Supp.
1985); MICH. R. EVID. 608(a); WASH. R. EvID. 608(a).
165. VT. R. EVID. 608. See also id. reporter's note.
166. See ALASKA R. EvID. 608; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.350 (1985); TEX. R.
EVID. 608.
167. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 609
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085 (1979); UTAH R. EvIn. 608; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 906.08 (West 1975).
168. FED. R. EvID. 609.
169. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
170. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1). This provision is an outgrowth of the line of
cases implementing the 1965 District of Columbia Circuit decision in Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For further discussion of the Luck
discretionary approach, see 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 609[03].
171. FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
172. Id.
173. See UNIF. R. EvID. 608 (1974).
174. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 (Supp. 1985);
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with minor variations, and two states 175 have adopted the uniform
rule. Three states' 76 allow impeachment only for crimes involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement. Nevada has eliminated the dis-
honesty provision, 77 while Vermont 178 retains the common-law
moral turpitude test. Nine states 179 have reduced judicial discre-
tion by eliminating the balancing requirement or by other means,
and seven states' 80 have increased discretion by extending the
balancing requirement. Montana' s ' forbids impeachment by
prior conviction, and Colorado' 82 has no comparable rule.
11. Rule 613: Prior Statements of Witnesses
Congress enacted rule 613183 substantially as promulgated
by the Supreme Court. 184 The uniform rule' 8 5 is identical to the
enacted federal rule.
Twenty-four states 8 6 have adopted rule 613(a) with some
MINN. R. EVID. 609; N.H. R. EvID. 609; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2609 (West
1980); UTAH R. EVID. 609; WASH. R. EVID. 609; Wyo. R. EVID. 609.
175. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 609
(1979); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 609.
176. See ALASKA R. EVID. 609; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 609 (Special Pamphlet 1980); IOWA R. EVID. 609.
177. NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.095 (1979).
178. VT. R. EVID. 609.
179. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6 10 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
609 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.095 (1979); N.M. R. EVID. 609; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 (1985); N.D. R. EVID. 609; OHIO R.
EVID. 609; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.355 (1985); W. VA. R. EVID. 609.
180. See IDAHO R. EVID. 609; ME. R. EVID. 609; MICH. R. EVID. 609; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14-12 to -16 (1979); TEX. R. EVID. 609; VT. R. EvID.
609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 1975).
181. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 609
(1985).
182. See 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 609-114.
183. FED. R. EVID. 613.
184. 56 F.R.D. 183, 278-79 (1973) (rule 613).
185. UNIF. R. EvID. 613 (1974).
186. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(a) (Supp.
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(a)
(1979); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 613(a); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 613(a) (Special Pamphlet 1980); IDAHO R. EVID. 613(a); IOWA R.
EVID. 613(a); ME. R. EvID. 613; MINN. R. EVID. 613(a); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(a) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-613(1)
(1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.135(1) (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 613(a); N.M. R. EVID.
613(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 613 (1985); N.D. R.
EVID. 613(a); OHIO R. EVID. 613(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.380 (1985); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 19-14-24 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2613(A) (West
1980); UTAH R. EVID. 613(a); VT. R. EVID. 613(a); W. VA. R. EvID. 613(a); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 906.13(1) (West 1975); Wyo. R. EvID. 613(a).
25
Wroth: The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspecti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
variations. Five states s7 retain some vestige of the common-law
requirement, which was eliminated in rule 613(a), that the witness
must be shown a prior statement. Twenty states' s have followed
rule 613(b) in allowing extrinsic evidence of an impeaching state-
ment without a prior opportunity for the witness to explain or
deny, provided that such opportunity is provided at some point.
Two states'8 9 have omitted the requirement of an opportunity to
explain; eight states °90 have retained the common-law require-
ment that the witness be confronted with the statement before
extrinsic evidence may be offered.
12. Rule 801: Hearsay-Definitions
The enacted federal rule 801,' 9' with a later 1975 amend-
ment, 92 is quite similar to that promulgated by the Supreme
Court. 193 In fact, the only variation between rule 801 and the
Supreme Court's version is Congress' addition to rule
801(d)(1) (A) of the requirement that, to be nonhearsay, prior in-
consistent testimony must have been given under oath in a pro-
ceeding or deposition. 194 The 1974 uniform rule' 95 is identical
187. See COLO. R. EVID. 613; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.614 (West Supp. 1985);
MICH. R. EvID. 613 (1978); TEx. R. EVID. 612; WASH. R. EvID. 613.
188. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(b) (Supp.
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(b)
(1979); IDAHO R. EvID. 613(b); IOWA R. EVID. 613(b); MICH. R. EviD. 613(b);
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(b) (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-613(2) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.135(2) (1979); N.H. R.
EvID. 613(b); N.M. R. EVID. 613(b); N.D. R. EVID. 613(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2613(B) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.380 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-14-25 (1979); UTAH R. EVID. 613(b); VT. R. EVID. 613(b); WASH. R.
EVID. 613(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.13(2) (West 1975); W. VA. R. EvID. 613(b);
Wyo. R. EVID. 613(b).
189. See ME. R. EvID. 613; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule
613 (1985).
190. See ALAsKA R. EVID. 613(b); COLO. R. EVID. 613(a); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
613(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.614(2) (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(b) (Special Pamphlet 1980); MINN. R.
EvID. 613(b); OHIO R. EvID. 613(B); TEX. R. EvID. 612(b).
191. For the text of rule 801 as originally enacted, see Rules of Evidence,
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1938 (1975).
192. See Act of Oct. 16, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (1976). The
amendment restored to the rule subdivision (d)(1)(C), which Congress had de-
leted in the original enactment.
193. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12, at 293 (rule 801).
194. The House Judiciary Committee reasoned that, in contrast to unsworn
statements, there can be no dispute as to whether a prior statement in a formal
proceeding or deposition was made. Moreover, the context of the proceedings
provides assurances of reliability. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7087. The Conference
Committee broadened the rule to include "other" proceedings, specifically the
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with enacted rule 801, except that it requires the oath in rule
801(d)(1)(A) only in a criminal proceeding, and it omits rule
801(d) (1) (C), which categorizes statements of identification based
on perception as nonhearsay.
Twenty-nine states 196 have adopted federal rule 801(a)-(c),
setting forth the definitions of "statement," "declarant," and
"hearsay," either verbatim or with minor variations. Texas, 197 in
a significant departure from the federal rule, has adopted a
unique subdivision (c), defining "matter asserted" to include
"any matter implied by a statement, if the probative value of the
statement as offered flows from the declarant's belief as to the
matter."' 19 8 The effect of this change is to retain for Texas the
common-law rule of Wright v. Doe d. Tatham,'" which held that
nonassertive verbal conduct offered to show the actor's belief in a
relevant fact is an implied assertion of the truth of that fact and is
thus inadmissible as hearsay. 200 Federal rule 801 (a) was expressly
intended to eliminate this doctrine. 20 1
There is more divergence in the adoption of federal rule
801(d). Fourteen states 20 2  have adopted federal rule
grand jury. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7104.
195. UNIF. R. EVID. 801 (1974).
196. See ALAsKA R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801(a)(c) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules
of Evidence, Rule 801(a)-(c) (1979); COLO. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c) (using "to be
communicated" instead of "assertion" in rule 801(a)(2)) DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
801(a)-(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(1)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(1)-(3) (Special Pamphlet 1980);
IDAHO R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); IOWA R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); ME. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c);
MICH. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); MINN. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(a)-(c) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(1)-
(3) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 51.015-045 (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c);
N.M. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule
801(a)-(c) (1985); N.D. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); OHIO R. EVID. 801(A)-(C); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(1)-(3) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-1(1)-(3) (1979); UTAH R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); VT.
R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); WASH. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); W. VA. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 908.01(1)-(3) (West 1975); Wyo. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c).
197. See TEX. R. EvID. 801(c).
198. See id.
199. 7 Adolph. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837), 5 Cl. & Fin.
670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
200. 7 Adolph. & E. at 388-89, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516-17. For a discussion
of this leading case-a favorite of law professors-see C. MCCORMICK, supra note
67, at 737-40.
201. FED. R. EVID. 801 (a) advisory committee note. See also 4 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 801-56 to -61.
202. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(2) (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO R. EVID.
801(d); IowA R. EVID. 801(d); ME. R. EVID. 801(d); MINN. R. EvID. 801(d); NEB.
1985] 1341
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801 (d) (1) (A) virtually verbatim. Ohio follows the federal rule but
adds the further limitation that the prior statement must have
been subject to cross-examination by the present opponent. 20 3
Eleven states 20 4 omit, or follow the uniform rule regarding the
oath requirement of rule 801(d) (1) (A). Wyoming's rule, which
otherwise follows the federal rule, is confined to criminal cases. 20 5
Hawaii20 6 treats a witness' prior inconsistent statements as a hear-
say exception and includes all written or recorded statements in
addition to those made under oath at a proceeding or deposition.
Michigan 20 7  and North Carolina 20 8  have omitted rule
801(d) (1) (A). Twenty-five states20 9 have adopted federal rule
801 (d) (1) (B), admitting prior consistent statements as substantive
evidence if offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or the
like. Hawaii 210 treats such statements as a hearsay exception. Or-
egon 21 I1 extends the rule to include prior consistent statements
REV. STAT. § 27-801(4) (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 801(d); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2801(4) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-16-2 to -3 (1979); TEX. R. EvID. 801 (e); VT. R. EvID. 801(d); WASH. R.
EvID. 801(d); W. VA. R. EvID. 801(d).
203. See OHIO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) & staff note. The effect is to eliminate
testimony before a grand jury. Id.
204. See ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(i) (1979); COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); DEL.
UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence,
Rules 801(d)(1)(A) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(a) (1979); N.M. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i); UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(i) (West 1975).
205. See Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
206. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.1 (Special
Pamphlet 1980).
207. See MIcH. R. EVID. 801(d).
208. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d) (1985).
209. See ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evi-
dence, Rules 801(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(ii) (1979); CoLo. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); DEL.
UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(2)(b) (West Supp. 1985);
IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); MINN. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(B); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule
801(d)(1)(B) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-801(4)(a)(ii) (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.035(2)(b) (1979); N.H. R. EVID. 801(2)(1)(B); N.M. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(B); N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(ii); OHIO R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(b); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(2) (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-
16-2(2) (1979); TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B); UTAH R. EVID. 8901(d)(1)(B); VT. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(ii); W.VA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(ii) (West 1975); Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
210. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.1(2) (Spe-
cial Pamphlet 1980).
211. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1985).
28
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offered to rebut prior inconsistent statements. Maine 212 allows
prior consistent statements only for their rebutting effect and not
as substantive evidence. Michigan 213 and North Carolina21 4 omit
rule 801(d)(1)(B). Twenty-four states2 15 have adopted federal
rule 801(d) (1) (C), admitting statements of recent identification,
and Hawaii216 again treats such statements as an exception. Min-
nesota217 and Ohio 218 add language calling for a finding of cir-
cumstantial reliability. Two states 219 follow the uniform rule in
omitting this provision, and North Carolina220 omits federal rule
801(d) (1) entirely.
Twenty states22' have adopted federal rule 801 (d) (2), making
admissions of parties admissible as nonhearsay, without substan-
tial change. Three states 222 have included a similar provision as a
212. See ME. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
213. See MICH. R. EVID. 801(d)(l).
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d) (1985).
215. See ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801(d)(l)(C) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d) (1) (iii) (1979); COLO. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (C); DEL.
UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(C); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(2)(c) (West Supp. 1985);
IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); ME. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C); MICH. R. EVID. (d)(1)(B); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of
Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(C) (1979);
N.H. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(C); N.M. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(c); N.D. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(iii); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-
16-2(3) (1979); TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(C); UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) VT. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); WASH. R. EVID. (d)(1)(iii) W. VA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(iii) (West 1975); Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(C).
216. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.1(3) (Spe-
cial Pamphlet 1980).
217. See MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). Minnesota also included statements
of present sense impression by a testifying declarant as nonhearsay. MINN. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(D).
218. See OHIO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
219. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a) (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2801(4)(a) (West 1980).
220. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d) (1985).
221. See ALASKA R, EVID. 801(d)(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801(d)(2) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules
of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1985); COLO. R. EvID. 801(d)(2);
IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(2); IOWA R. EvID. 801(d)(2); MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(2);
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2) (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(b) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(3) (1979); N.H. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2); N.M. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.450 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-3 (1979); UTAH R.
EVID. 801(d)(2); VT. R. EvID. 801(d)(2); W. VA. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 908.01(4)(b) (West 1975); Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
222. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(18) (West 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(a) (Special Pamphlet 1980); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d) (1985).
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hearsay exception. The remaining seven states 223 have made
modifications to various provisions of the rule.
13. Rule 803: Hearsay Exceptions-Availability of Declarant
Immaterial
As enacted, federal rule 803224 contains the twenty-four hear-
say exceptions found in the Supreme Court version, with substan-
tial changes in rules 803(6),225 803(8),226 and 803(24).227 The
1974 uniform rule 228 is essentially similar to the enacted federal
rule with only minor variations in detail.
Every state has adopted the general pattern of rule 803. Spe-
223. See DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) (proof of conspiracy); ME. R. EVID.
801(d)(2) (statements of agents of principals or employers excluded from rule
801(d)(2)(C)); MICH. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) (statements in connection with motor
vehicle misdemeanor guilty plea excluded from rule 801(d)(2)(A); rule
801(d)(2)(b) qualified by reference to Michigan case law); OHIO R. EvID.
801(d)(2) (proof of conspiracy in rule 801(d)(2)(C)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2801(4)(b) (West 1980) (omits "made during the existence of the relation-
ship" from rule 801(d)(2)(D)); TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2) (adds depositions as a
further category); WASH. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (iv) (limits rule 801 (d) (2) (iv) to state-
ment which agent had authority to make).
224. FED. R. EVID. 803.
225. Rule 803(6) excepts from the hearsay rule records of regularly con-
ducted business activity. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). The Supreme Court draft did
not confine the exception to "business" activities. See Supreme Court Draft, supra
note 12, at 300-01. The congressional change reflected doubt as to the reliabil-
ity of non-business records. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7087-88. Judge Weinstein has sug-
gested that the effect of the changes by Congress has not been significant. See 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 803-10 to -11.
226. Rule 803(8) excepts public records and reports. See FED. R. EVID.
803(8). The change suggested by the House Judiciary Committee and adopted
in the federal rule excludes from the hearsay exception reports containing mat-
ters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel in criminal
cases. The rationale for the additional exclusions is that observations by police
officers at the scene of the crime are not as reliable as observations by public
officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation
between the police and the defendant in a criminal trial. See S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051,
7064; CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7104-05.
227. Rule 803(24) is a "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R.
EVID. 803(24). The Supreme Court's version also allowed as an exception any
statement having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness "comparable" to
those of the exceptions in rule 803(1)-(23). See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 12,
at 303 (rule 803(24)). Congress narrowed the exception with requirements that
the statement be material and probative and that admission serve the purposes
of the rules and the interests ofjustice. A notice provision also was added. See
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7065-66; CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 11, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7105.
228. UNIF. R. EvID. 803 (1974).
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cific exceptions where there are substantial state variations are
rules 803(1) (six states),2 29 803(4) (seven states), 230 803(5) (eight
states),23 1 803(6) (ten states), 232 803(8) (eighteen states),2 33
803(18) (twelve states), 234 and 803(22) (fourteen states).235 Thir-
teen states 236 have adopted federal rule 803(24), the catch-all ex-
ception, verbatim; seven 23 7 have adopted it with slight changes;
229. See COLO. R. EVID. 803(1) (variations) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(1)
(West 1979) (variations); MINN. R. EVID., 803(1) (exceptions omitted); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-803 (1979) (exceptions omitted); OHIO R. EvID. 803(1) (variations);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (1985) (exceptions omitted).
230. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(4) (West 1979); IDAHO R. EvID. 803(4);
MICH. R. EvID. 803(4); MINN. R. EVID. 803(4); N.H. R. EVID. 803(4); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(4) (West 1980); VT. R. EVID. 803(4).
231. See CoLo. R. EVID. 803(5); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(5); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.803(5) (West 1979); N.H. R. EVID. 803(5); OHIO R. EVID. 803(5); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(5) (West 1980); TEX. R. EvID. 803(5); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 908.03(5) (West 1975).
232. See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(6); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 803(6) (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) (West 1979); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(b)(6) (Special Pamphlet 1980);
MICH. R. EVID. 803(6); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule
803(6) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803(6) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135
(1979); OHIO R. EvID. 803(6); WASH. R. EvID. 803(6) (omitted by statute).
233. See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(8); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules
of Evidence, Rule 803(8) (Supp. 1985); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(8); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.803(8) (West 1979); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(8); IOWA R. EVID. 803(8); ME.
R. EVID. 803(8); MICH. R. EVID. 803(8); MINN. R. EVID. 803(8); MONT. CODE
ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10 Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(8) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
803(8) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.155 (1979); N.D. R. EvID. 803(8); OHIO R.
EvID. 803(8); TEX. R. EVID. 803(8); VT. R. EVID. 803(8); WASH. R. EVID. 803(8)
(as covered by statute); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(8) (West 1975).
234. See COLO. R. EVID. 803(18); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979)
(omitted); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(18); IOWA R. EVID. 803(18); ME. R. EvID. 803(18);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803 (1979) (omitted); N.H. R. EvID. 803(18); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.255 (1979); OHIO R. EVID. 803 (omitted); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460
(1985) (omitted); VT. R. EVID. 803(18); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(18) (West
1975).
235. See ALASKA R. EvID. 803(22) (omitted); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001,
Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(22) (Supp. 1985); COLO. R. EVID. 803(22);
DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(22); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979) (omitted);
ME. R. EVID. 803(22); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule
803(22) (1985); N.H. R. EVID. 803(22) (omitted); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules
of Evidence, Rule 803(22) (1985) (omitted); N.D. R. EvID. 803(22); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.460 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-26 (1979); TEX. R.
EVID. 803(22); VT. R. EVID. 803(22).
236. See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(24); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 803(24) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 803(24) (1979 & Supp. 1985); COLO. R. EVID. 803(24); DEL UNIF. R.
EVID. 803(24); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24); IOWA R. EVID. 803(24); N.M. R. EVID.
803(24); N.D. R. EVID. 803(24); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-28 (1979);
UTAH R. EVID. 803(24); W. VA. R. EVID. 803(24); Wvo. R. EVID. 803(24).
237. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, rule 803(24) (Spe-
cial Pamphlet 1980); MINN. R. EVID. 803(24); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803(22);
N.H. R. EVID. 803(24); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24)
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and two states 238 have adopted the Supreme Court version. Eight
states 23 9 have omitted the catch-all exception. Exceptions in state
rules not found in the federal rules include business records in
justice courts (Delaware), 240 statements of putative victims who
are minors (Vermont),24' former testimony of declarant in civil
action (Florida),242 deposition testimony of an expert (Michi-
gan),243 and complaints of sexual misconduct (Oregon).244 Texas
adopted the statement against interest exception (federal rule
804(b)(3)) as Texas rule 803 (24), making the exception applica-
ble regardless of the declarant's availability. 245
14. Rule 804: Hearsay Exceptions-Declarant Unavailable
Congress enacted rule 804246 with a number of changes from
the Supreme Court version, 247 including the omission of the
Supreme Court's rule 804(b)(2), which dealt with statements of
recent perception. 248 The 1974 uniform rule24 9 follows the
Supreme Court rule in retaining the "recent perception" excep-
tion and broader versions of the exceptions for dying declarations
(1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(24) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.460 (1983).
238. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24)
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(24) (West 1975).
239. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979); ME. R. EvID. 803;
MICH. R. EVID. 803; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 51.075-.365 (1979); OHIO R. EVID. 803;
TEX. R. EvID. 803; VT. R. EVID. 803; WASH. R. EVID. 803.
240. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(25).
241. See VT. R. EVID. 804(a).
242. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979).
243. See MICH. R. EVID. 803(18).
244. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (1983).
245. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
246. FED. R. EVID. 804.
247. For a substantive discussion of the congressional changes to the
Supreme Court's rule 804, see 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 804-3
to -16.
248. Supreme Court rule 804(b)(2) provided a hearsay exception for any
"statement of recent perception," which it described as
a statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes,
or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant,
made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated liti-
gation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear.
Supreme Court Draft, supra note 14, at 321 (rule 804(b)(2)). The House Judiciary
Committee eliminated the exception on the grounds that it was too broad, and
that it might allow admission of statements not considered trustworthy. See H.R.
REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7075, 7079-80.
249. UNIF. R. EVID. 804 (1974).
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and statements against interest. The uniform rule varies from the
Supreme Court's version, however, in that it adopts the enacted
version of federal rule 804(b)(5), the catch-all exception.
The states have adopted most of federal rule 804 with only
minor changes. Principal variations are in rules 804(b)(2) (four-
teen states)250 and 804(b)(3) (ten states). 251 Four states 252 have
adopted the recent perception exception deleted by Congress.
All but eight states 253 have adopted federal rule 804(b)(5), or an
equivalent catch-all exception. Delaware has omitted it, despite
having adopted rule 803(24).254 Nevada has adopted the
equivalent of rule 804(b)(5) while omitting rule 803(24).255 Ex-
ceptions in state rules not found in the federal rule include an
exception in South Dakota 256 and New Hampshire257 for state-
ments by decedents; an exception in Oregon 258 for statements
made in a professional capacity; an exception in Ohio 2 59 for state-
ments made by deceased, deaf-mute, or incompetent persons;
and an exception in Vermont2 60 for statements as to boundaries
of land.
250. See ALASKA R. EvID. 804(b)(2); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(2) (1979); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(b) (West 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 804(b)(2) (Special Pamphlet 1980); IowA R. EVID. 804(b)(2); ME. R.
EVID. 804(b)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(b) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 51.335 (1979); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.465 (1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-31 (1979); UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 908.045(3) (West 1975).
251. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
804(b)(3) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(c) (West 1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 51.345 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3)(1985); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); OHIO R. EVID. 804(B)(3); TEX. R. EVlD.
804(b)(3); VT. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 908.045(4) (West 1975).
252. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(5)
(Special Pamphlet 1980); N.M. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 908.04(2)
(West 1975); Wyo. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
253. See generally DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 804; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804 (West
1979); ME. R. EVID. 804; MICH. R. EVID. 804; OHIo R. EVID. 804; TEx. R. EVID.
804; VT. R. EVID. 804; WASH. R. EVID. 804.
254. See DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(24).
255. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.315 (1979).
256. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-34 (1979).
257. See N.H. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25
(1974 & Supp. 1985) (part of New Hampshire's earlier repeal of dead man's
statute); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 65, at 160 n.7.
258. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.465 (1985).
259. See OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
260. See VT. R. EVID. 804(b)(4)(C).
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C. The Value of Uniformity
The preceding discussion has emphasized the number and
form of the differences between the Federal Rules and state adap-
tations. None of these differences, however, can obscure the fact
that the basic plan and principles of the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply in all thirty of the states that have adopted them and have
significant influence in other jurisdictions as well. On certain pro-
visions, states have struck out on their own in order to preserve
traditional state practice, to follow what has turned out to be the
losing path in the development of one of the Federal Rules, or to
break new ground. Nevertheless, in nearly all of the rules states,
uniformity has come to mean a common format and organiza-
tional plan, usually with identical or nearly identical numbering;
common provisions in identical or nearly identical language in
the great majority of rules; and agreement on the subjects that are
to be included and excluded from the body of the rules.
Most important, the Federal Rules have put the law of evi-
dence in a single frame of reference. The structure and content
of key rules that have been universally adopted mean that there is
now widespread common agreement on the vocabulary and con-
ceptual framework in which the basic principles ofjudicial notice,
presumptions, relevance, privilege, competence, hearsay, authen-
tication, and best evidence are to be understood and discussed.
Disagreement with a particular formulation of a rule can only be
expressed by reference and reaction to the Federal Rules and the
growing body of legal literature that has embraced their
scheme.261
Uniformity at this level is a significant achievement of great
potential for the future development of the law of evidence. If
the Federal Rules do not yet realize Wigmore's 26 2 or Morgan's 263
dream of a rational and efficient code of evidence, they are, never-
theless, a major breakthrough. With a common vocabulary and
framework, evidence scholars are able to move away from the
261. See Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of
Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 257-58 (1984). Professor Younger's view
of state-federal uniformity is less positive than that suggested here. See Younger,
Introduction, Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 251, 254
n. 17 (1984) ("The prudence of uniformity of practice between state and federal
courts is hardly self-evident. And if the Rules were folly to begin with, their
replication among the states would not make them wise.").
262. See, e.g., J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE xix (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) (preface to
first edition) (Wigmore stating that his goal is "to expound the Anglo-American
law of Evidence as a system of reasoned principles and rules").
263. See generally Morgan & Maguire, supra note 68.
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sorting and comparison of variant rules to focus on substance and
the real impact of the law of evidence upon the effectiveness of
the adversary process as an instrument of justice.
III. FORM OF ADOPTION: RULE VS. STATUTE
The principal vehicle for state adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence has been rules promulgated by the courts under stat-
utory or constitutional authority. In light of the continuing legis-
lative interest in evidence law reform since the mid-nineteenth
century, 264 however, conflict between the legislative and judicial
branches has been an inevitable feature of the effort at both the
state and federal levels. This part of the paper takes the position
that judicial rulemaking is not only a proper method for the re-
form and codification of evidence rules, but is the preferable
method. Part IV of this paper proposes a model intended to re-
solve, or at least accommodate, any conflict between the legisla-
tive and judicial branches.
By 1940, judicial rulemaking power had become sufficiently
accepted as a means of procedural reform265 that it was a natural
medium for the development of uniform and codified evidence
rules. Both the 1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uni-
form Rules of Evidence were designed to be adopted either as
court rules or legislation. 266 The impetus for adoption of the
Federal Rules came in 1961 from the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 267 Originally, the Federal Rules were planned,
drafted, and promulgated as rules of court under the Supreme
Court's general statutory power to make rules governing "prac-
tice and procedure" so long as those rules do not invade "any
substantive right."2 68 Through a mixture of motives, some of
which were articulated as concern for the scope of that rulemak-
264. For a cogent historical summary of the development of the legislative
role, see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 67-77.
265. See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
91-129 (1949); Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rulemaking:
An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951). See also J.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 82-84 (1977); Dooley,
The Regulation of the Practice of Law, Practice and Procedure, and Court Administration in
Vermont-Judicial or Legislative Power?, 8 VT. L. REV. 211, 237-39 (1983).
266. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 2 comment (1942); UNIF. R. EVID.
2 comment (1953).
267. For a discussion of the work of the Judicial Conference, see supra text
accompanying notes 5 & 7.
268. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
promulgation of the Federal Rules, see supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
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ing power, Congress stepped in and took over the process 269 so
that the final version of the Federal Rules was statutory.2 70 Under
the act adopting the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court has been
given power to amend the rules subject to congressional review,
but Congress has also reserved the power to amend any rule
"proposed or in force." 271
In the states, as might be expected, the experience has been
varied. In nine2 72 of the thirty states that have adopted the Fed-
eral Rules or some variation thereof, adoption has been by legis-
lative enactment. In the remaining twenty-one states, the rules
have been promuglated by the state's hightest court under the
authority of statutory, or inherent or express constitutional
rulemaking power. The role of the legislature in these promulga-
tions has ranged from apathy through inquisitiveness to
hostility.2 73
A. The Scope of Judicial Rulemaking Power
Two basic questions concerning the scope of judicial power
to promulgate rules of evidence have been debated since 1961,
when the Judicial Conference of the United States made its initial
269. For a discussion of congressional maneuvering to take over the rule-
making process, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
270. See Rules of Evidence (Evidence Rules Enabling Act), Pub. L. No. 93-
595, § 2-3, 88 Stat. 1926, 1948 (1975).
271. See id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982)).
272. See Act of February 10, 1976, Act 1143, 1976 Ark. Acts 2799 (codified
at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979 & Supp. 1985)); Act of June 23, 1976, ch.
76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws 556 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-90.958 (West
Supp. 1985)); Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Act 164, 1980 Hawaii Sess. Laws 244
(codified at HAwAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 100-1102 (Spe-
cial Pamphlet 1980)); Rules of Evidence, ch. 219, 1983 Iowa Acts 713 (codified
at IOWA CODE § 684.18-19 (1983)); Act of May 22, 1975, Leg. Bill 279, 1975
Neb. Laws 528 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (1979)). Act of
April 22, 1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nev. Laws 775 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 47.020-56.020 (1979)); Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 701, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
666 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules of Evidence, Rules 101-1102
(1985)); Civil Procedure-Criminal Procedure-Evidence Code, ch. 285, 1978
Okla. Sess. Laws 801 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2101-3103 (West
1980)); Act of August 22, 1981, ch. 892, 1981 Or. Laws 1374 (codified at OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 40.010-40.585 (1983)).
273. Inquisitiveness: In Vermont, the Legislative Committee on Judicial
Rules, established by 1981 amendments to 12 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-4, held exten-
sive hearings on the rules of evidence, but finally interposed no effective obsta-
cle to the promulgation in 1983 of the Vermont Rules of Evidence. See Dooley,
supra note 265, at 220 n.51. Hostility: In Ohio, the General Assembly in 1977
and 1978 prevented the Ohio Supreme Court's proposed rules of evidence from
going into effect, by concurrent resolution. After legislative hearings in 1979
and 1980, the court promulgated a revised draft that was not opposed when it
became effective in 1980. See Blakey, supra note 32, at 242.
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recommendation for a feasibility study of federal evidence
rules.2
74
The first question is whether there is judicial power to adopt
rules of evidence at all.2 75 The underlying issue here is a consti-
tutional one of separation of powers-the extent of the inherent
power of the judiciary, acting in its administrative capacity as a
separate branch of government, to regulate the practice and pro-
cedure of the courts. 276 In the federal system, because Congress
has asserted primary power over procedure, this question has
boiled down to one of statutory interpretation. Specifically, the
issue is whether rules of evidence are rules of "practice and pro-
cedure" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act. 277 The
form of this question in the states varies according to the manner
in which the law of each state articulates the rulemaking power
and with the extent of the inherent judicial power granted by the
state constitution. If judicial rulemaking authority is based on
state statutory or constitutional language similar to that in the
federal Rules Enabling Act, the problem is a similar one of inter-
pretation. In the absence of such a provision, the issue is one of
the scope of inherent judicial power. 278 The general response to
this question has been in the affirmative. Today, it is recognized
that the judicial branches of both the federal and state govern-
ments possess general rulemaking power over evidence that is at
least concurrent with that of the legislative branches, if it is not
exclusive. 279
The second, more specific question then arises: Are particu-
lar rules of evidence that may implicate matters going beyond the
274. For a discussion of the initial recommendation for a feasibility study,
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
275. This and other related questions have been addressed by Congress-
man William L. Hungate, who chaired the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives that studied the Federal Rules. See
Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32 FED. B.J. 225, 228-29
(1973).
276. See generally A. VANDERBILT, supra note 265, at 132-34; J. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 265, at 4-8, 21, 52-55.
277. 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1977). See also Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 29,
32, 35;J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 71-73, 89-96; Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 16, 24-26 (1978).
278. See Ashman, Measuring the Judicial Rulemaking Power, 59 J. AM. JUD. SEC.
215 (1975). See also A. VANDERBILT, supra note 265, at 132-36; J. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 265, at 77-84; Dooley, supra note 265, at 239; Giannelli, supra note
277, at 26-33.
279. See Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 29-40. See also J. WEINSTEIN, supra
note 265, at 71-73, 77-84.
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confines of the courtroom within the judicial rulemaking power?
The basic rationale for the conclusion that rules of evidence in
general are rules of "practice and procedure" within the judicial
power has been that rules of evidence are by and large aimed at
regulating the trial of facts to produce a fair and efficient judicial
process. They are either "traffic-control" rules describing the
mechanics of trial and the respective powers and obligations of
judge and jury, or they are screening rules designed to keep from
the jury evidence that will waste its time or tempt it into error.280
Such rules, intrinsic to the judicial process, plainly fall within the
scope of judicial power to regulate practice in the courts by rule.
Some rules, however, though usually denominated "rules of evi-
dence" because they operate to keep particular items of evidence
from the trier of fact, have another aspect. These are rules based
at least in part on policies that serve interests extrinsic to the judi-
cial process. 281 Thus, the second question may be restated as
whether such rules primarily serve one of those extrinsic interests
and thus depend upon a policy judgment which should be made
only by the legislature or by a court announcing a common-law
rule in the adversarial context of litigation. If the answer to this
question is "yes," then the rule arguably may be deemed beyond
the rulemaking power.
In the federal system, this second question has a dual aspect.
The judicial rulemaking power is circumscribed not only by the
limits that Congress has historically been permitted to place upon
it, but also by limits on all federal power inherent in a federal
system in which national powers are only those expressed and im-
plied in the Constitution and in which all other governmental
power is reserved to the states or to the people. This limitation
has its classic exposition in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 28 2 which held
that the Constitution requires the application of state law in fed-
eral courts except as to matters in which there is a constitutional
grant of federal power. The enacted version of the Federal Rules
of Evidence reflects both sources of limitation. In certain areas,
notably the rules of privilege, the rules adopted by the Supreme
Court were eliminated altogether as intruding upon congres-
280. See Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 361-63 (1969). See also C. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 621-22 (4th ed. 1983).
281. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 280, at 624; Weinstein, supra note 280, at
363-73. See generally J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 73-74, 80-81 n.270.
282. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 280, at 352-64.
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sional and common-law prerogatives. 283 In this and other areas,
the Federal Rules also make express reservations of state power
in cases where state law creates the rule of decision. 284 These
unique aspects of the judicial rulemaking power in the federal sys-
tem mean that the federal experience may not offer direct author-
ity for resolving questions of state judicial power. 285
In the states, the second question is primarily one of separa-
tion of powers. While theoretically, as 1974 uniform rule 302286
suggests, a state rule of evidence could impinge upon an area of
express federal power, the broad and general nature of most evi-
dence rules and their focus on either the business of the trial
courts or proper state interests makes for very little direct con-
flict. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution28 7
will prevent a general state rule from infringing on federal power
in a particular case. The separation of powers issue has been ad-
dressed in a variety of forms in many different jurisdictions.28 8 It
is inherent in all efforts to regulate practice and procedure by ju-
dicial rule, but it comes to a particular head with evidence rules
because, as the discussion in Part IV of this paper suggests, so
many of them serve both the intrinsic interest of the judiciary in
the trial process and an extrinsic interest more properly served by
legislation or common-law decision. Determination of the ques-
283. For a discussion of privileges, see supra notes 119-41 and accompany-
ing text. For further insight into Congress' reasons for deleting the Supreme
Court rules on privileges, see H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082-83; 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 4, §§ 5421-5422; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 73-74.
284. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 302, 501, 601. Those reservations were in-
tended to reflect the policies, if not the command, of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). See sources cited supra notes 75, 126, 151. See alsoJ. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 265, at 73 n.271.
285. See Giannelli, supra note 277, at 26-37.
286. UNIr. R. EvID. 302 (1974). Uniform rule 302 provides:
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting
a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law
supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal
law.
Id. The rule was intended to be the mirror image of federal rule 302, which
provides that state law governs the effect of presumptions in federal courts when
the rule of decision is governed by state law. For citations to the eight states that
have adopted uniform rule 302, see supra note 77.
287. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause states that the Consti-
tution and the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Id.
288. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 73-74, 77-84; Giannelli, supra
note 277, at 21-46; Note, Rules of Evidence: An Exercise of Constitutional Power by the
Michigan Supreme Court, 1980 DET. C.L. REV. 1063. See generally A. VANDERBILT,
supra note 265, at 132-36.
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tion of authority to promulgate a particular rule of evidence that
serves interests not solely intrinsic to the judicial process thus re-
quires an analysis of the rule to determine the precise interests
involved and a balancing of those interests.
B. Judicial Rulemaking Preferred
To the extent that the judiciary possesses rulemaking power
over rules of evidence, court rules are, on balance, the preferred
medium for the adoption of state rules of evidence. There are at
least three advantages to the use of judicial rulemaking power in
adopting rules of evidence: 289 (1) Judicial rulemaking permits the
judges, who ultimately are responsible for the conduct of judicial
business and have the technical expertise, to have the major say in
the scope and content of the rules. Moreover, judicial rulemaking
occurs without the necessity of having to plead before the legisla-
ture. (2) Due to the flexibility of timetable and procedure and the
opportunity for collegial review and action by the court, judicial
rulemaking lends itself to a more systematic and coherent draft-
ing process. (3) The amendment process for court rules is far
more flexible and efficient than that of the legislature. The court
can provide for a continuous monitoring of the rules in operation
and can make amendments as necessary to meet changing de-
mands of practice.
The disadvantages of judicial rulemaking are suggested by
the limitations on its scope. First, judicial rulemaking may give
rise to a conflict with the legislature if either branch is insensitive
to the powers and prerogatives of the other. Second, judicial
rulemaking may appear distinctly counter-majoritarian if it is con-
ducted without some form of public notice and participation. 290
These disadvantages are eliminated by a properly delineated and
implemented rulemaking process.
IV. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR STATE EVIDENCE RULEMAKING
To assist states that have not yet adopted rules of evidence,
Part IV of this paper reviews in greater detail the concerns about
judicial rulemaking noted in Part III and sets forth model guide-
lines intended to meet those concerns.
289. SeeJ. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 12-21. But cf. id. at 102-04 (noting
certain disadvantages of exercise of rulemaking power by United States
Supreme Court).
290. Id. at 4-8, 77-79.
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A. The Concerns
Three principal concerns arise when rules of evidence are
adopted by court rule. The first is the exact path of the line be-
tween judicial and legislative power over the matters traditionally
deemed to constitute the law of evidence. The second is the prac-
tical dimension of the relationship between the judicial and legis-
lative branches when each seeks to act on the same subject. The
third is the nature and openness of the process by which the court
adopts the rules.
1. The Line Between Judicial and Legislative Power
As noted in Part III, some rules of evidence plainly are within
the judicial rulemaking power in that they are housekeeping rules
that serve the functions of traffic-control or screening. Such rules
primarily serve the intrinsic interests of the judiciary in the fair
and efficient conduct of trials. Other rules of evidence, however,
are the province of the legislature or the common law because
they are based on policy considerations extrinsic to the judicial
process. This distinction is not always clear and may require a
balancing process. The following review of the Federal Rules of
Evidence seeks to illuminate the distinction between rules that
serve intrinsic judicial interests and those that are based on ex-
trinsic policy considerations.
a. Article I: General Provisions
The rules contained in article I of the Federal Rules291 are
traffic-control rules, covering primarily the mechanics by which
evidence is to be received, considered, and admitted. These rules
plainly serve intrinsic judicial interests.
b. Article II: Judicial Notice
Rule 201,292 covering judicial notice, is a screening rule
designed to withdraw from possible erroneous jury determination
factual questions so indisputable that no reasonable issue re-
mains. The rule establishes a judicial power and the mechanics of
its exercise that are necessary to the intrinsic judicial interest in
fair and efficient trial. The rule serves no extrinsic policies.
291. See generally FED. R. EvIo. 101-106.
292. FED. R. EvID. 201. For a further discussion of rule 201, see supra
notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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c. Article III: Presumptions
Rules concerning presumptions fall into two categories:
(1) those which describe either the effect of presumptions or the
manner in which they are to be applied in litigation, and (2) those
which create specific presumptions. Federal rule 301, describing
the effect of presumptions in civil actions, and uniform rule 303,
describing the manner of instructing the jury as to a criminal pre-
sumption and the effect to be given to it, are rules of the first
category. 293 These rules are in one respect traffic-control rules,
serving only interests intrinsic to the judicial system, since they
involve the mechanics of the trial process. They may also affect
extrinsic interests, however, because they dictate the weight of
the burden to be imposed in the name of any extrinsic policy that
a presumption may reflect. Federal rule 302,294 providing that
state law controls the effect of a presumption where that law pro-
vides the rule of decision, treats rules of the first category as af-
fecting extrinsic interests for federalism purposes. They may,
however, be deemed to be of intrinsic judicial interest for separa-
tion of powers purposes. 295
Rules creating specific presumptions also may be either traf-
fic-control rules or rules affecting extrinsic interests. Traffic-con-
trol presumptions are those which shift the burden of production
to the party who has better access to the facts or the party who
must argue the less probable side of a common issue.296 Pre-
sumptions that serve extrinsic interests do so primarily by impos-
ing burdens on disfavored classes of litigants. 297 Analysis is
rendered complex by the fact that many presumptions serve both
intrinsic and extrinsic purposes. 298 The only specific presump-
tions created by the Federal Rules are the self-authentication pro-
293. See FED. R. EvID. 301; UNIF. R. EvID. 303 (1974). For a discussion of
the two rules, see supra notes 67-69 (federal rule 301) & 81-82 (uniform rule
303) and accompanying text.
294. FED. R. EvID. 302. For a discussion of rule 302, see supra note 75.
295. See supra note 75. See also 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4,
§ 5132; Giannelli, supra note 277, at 50.
296. For an example of a traffic-control presumption, see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 67, § 343 (discussing presumption that properly mailed letter was
duly delivered).
297. For an example of a presumption that serves extrinsic interests, see id.
at 968 (discussing presumption of ownership from prior possession).
298. For an example of a presumption that serves both intrinsic and extrin-
sic interests, see id. at 972 (discussing presumption that child born during mar-
riage is legitimate, which is based both on probability and social policy of
avoiding stigma and societal burdens of illegitimacy).
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visions of rule 902,299 which are primarily of intrinsic effect.
d. Article IV: Relevancy
The rules of relevance 300 are primarily screening rules
designed to keep from the jury evidence that may waste time or
mislead because of its low probative value or high prejudicial con-
tent. Such rules plainly serve intrinsic judicial interests. This is
so despite the occasionally troubling fact that the "special" rules
of relevance found in federal rules 407-410301 serve extrinsic in-
terests as well in their exclusionary effect. These rules are in-
stances where not only is the logical inference that the jury is
asked to draw a tenuous one, but exclusion serves some extrinsic
policy such as the encouragement of repairs of conditions that
have caused accidents. 30 2 The rules, nevertheless, primarily affect
intrinsic judicial interests because their screening purposes
predominate. Moreover, their incidental extrinsic purposes serve
either general interests of the judicial system, such as the encour-
agement of compromise, or generic social values that the courts
should not be barred from furthering in the absence of a contrary
legislative policy.
e. Article V: Privileges
Like rules governing presumptions, rules governing privi-
leges can serve either intrinsic judicial interests or extrinsic socie-
tal policies. Rules that merely describe the conditions under
which privileges are to be asserted are traffic-control rules,30 3
while rules that define specific privileges are the plainest exam-
ples of rules serving interests entirely extrinsic to the trial pro-
cess.30 4 Only the lawyer-client privilege3 0 5 conceivably serves
299. FED. R. EVID. 902. See also infra note 320. See generally 21 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 568-69. A few states have created other specific
presumptions in their rules. See supra notes 78-80. Note that the Hawaii and
Oregon rules are both statutory. See supra note 80.
300. FED. R. EVID. 401-412.
301. FED. R. EvID. 407-410.
302. See FED. R. EviD. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial efforts inad-
missible to prove negligence). See also FED. R. EvID. 409 (evidence of offer to pay
medical expenses is inadmissible to prove liability). See generally C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 67, at 811, 815, 818. For a further discussion of federal rule 407, see
supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
303. For examples of such rules, see UNIF. R. EVID. 510-512 (1974) (adopt-
ing Supreme Court's draft version of rules 511-513). For the history of the priv-
ilege rules, see supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
304. For examples of such rules, see UNIF. R. EvID. 502-509 (1974) (adopt-
ing Supreme Court's draft version of rules 503-510).
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intrinsic judicial interests. Every other privilege serves extrinsic
societal policies. Moreover, such privileges generally serve inter-
ests contrary to those of the judiciary, since they inhibit the trial
process by preventing full development of the facts.306
In the Federal Rules, Congress recognized the extrinsic na-
ture of privileges by providing that state privilege law governs in a
civil action where state law supplies the rule of decision.30 7
f. Article VI: Witnesses
Most of the rules in article V1308 clearly are traffic-control or
screening rules. In the Federal Rules, Congress elected to defer
to "state policy," however, by providing a saving clause for rules
of competency on state law issues.30 9 Since rules of competency,
including the dead man's statutes, 3 10 are screening rules intended
to keep from the jury evidence that is unreliable either because of
the lack of capacity of the witness or the inability to rebut, this
seems a misguided decision based more on politics than policy.3 1 '
g. Article VII: Opinions and Expert Witnesses
The rules in article V11 312 govern the admissibility of opinion
testimony in general and expert testimony specifically. Such
rules, which function only as screening and traffic-control rules,
are plainly intrinsic in effect.
h. Article VIII: Hearsay
The rules in article V1113 13 define "hearsay" 314 and govern
305. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974) (adopting the Supreme Court's draft
version of 503).
306. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 170-72. This was one of the ma-
jor reasons for Congress' decision to delete rules 502-513 of the Supreme
Court's version of the Federal Rules. See 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14,
501[01], at 501-13.
307. See FED. R. EVID. 501. See also CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7100-01.
308. FED. R. EVID. 601-615.
309. See FED. R. EVID. 601. For a discussion of Congress' decision to defer
to state policy, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
310. For a discussion of dead man's statutes, see supra note 151 and accom-
panying text.
311. See generally Schmertz, supra note 151, at 1376-405 (arguing that while
Congress undoubtedly possessed power to insist that federal courts defer to
state law in area of incompetency, the decision to do so was unwise and should
be reconsidered by both Congress and Supreme Court).
312. FED. R. EviD. 701-706.
313. FED. R. EvID. 801-806.
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when such evidence is admissible through a general exclusionary
rule315 and numerous exceptions thereto. 31 6 Such rules plainly
are screening rules and serve only intrinsic judicial interests. The
essence of the hearsay rule is to prevent the jury from hearing
evidence of statements that are deemed unreliable because they
are not offered under oath and subjected to cross examination in
the jury's presence. 317 The exceptions are based on the premises
that particular kinds of statements have guarantees of trustworthi-
ness that overcome their potential unreliability and that they may
be of more than ordinary value to the course of the litigation.318
Thus, the hearsay rules serve what is predominantly an intrinsic
judicial interest.
i. Article IX: Authentication and Identification
The rules in article IX3l 9 govern authentication of evidence.
Such rules are special rules of relevance designed to assure that
real or documentary evidence presented to the jury is what it pur-
ports to be. Authentication rules are screening rules that serve
only intrinsic judicial interests. 320
j. Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings,
and Photographs
The rules in article X32 1 constitute the best evidence rule.
The focus of these special rules of relevance is on assuring relia-
bility of documentary evidence where content is at issue.32 2 Such
rules clearly are screening rules and serve intrinsic judicial
interests.
314. FED. R. EVID. 801. For a further discussion of federal rule 801, see
supra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
315. FED. R. EVID. 802.
316. FED. R. EVID. 803-804. For a further discussion of the hearsay excep-
tions, see supra notes 224-45 (federal rule 803) & 246-60 (federal rule 804) and
accompanying text.
317. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 726-28.
318. See id. § 253. Cf FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
319. FED. R. EvID. 901-903.
320. But cf FED. R. EVID. 902. While the provisions of rule 902, setting
forth instances of documents that may be admitted as self-authenticating without
extrinsic evidence, are in effect presumptions, they are of the type which serve
solely intrinsic judicial interests. See supra text accompanying note 299. See gener-
ally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 700-01.
321. FED. R. EvID. 1001-1008.
322. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 702-05.
1985] 1359
45
Wroth: The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspecti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
2. Accommodation of Judicial and Legislative Power
The scope of rulemaking power has a practical dimension.
Whatever the theoretical scope of their respective powers, the ju-
diciary and the legislature generally act concurrently. The ques-
tion thus arises: What happens when rules of court and statutes
clash? The answers to this question have varied and will vary
from state to state according to the terms of the state constitu-
tion's judicial article, the terms of any rules enabling legislation
that may exist, and the political relations between the branches.
What follows describes the minimum conditions for effective
rulemaking.
a. Judicial Power to Supersede Evidentiary Statutes
As the concept of judicial rulemaking began to gather mo-
mentum in the first half of this century, the power to supersede
inconsistent statutes by rule was a recurrent theme.3 23 Language
granting such a power has been incorporated in the federal and in
many state enabling acts.3 24 If the power to supersede is not ex-
pressly granted, however, it is necessary to invent it. The courts
of some states have done just that, finding inherent power to su-
persede legislation implicit in the grant of rulemaking power in
their respective state constitutions.325
The necessity for the power is manifest. In most jurisdic-
tions, there is a large body of pre-existing statutory law on evi-
dence. State codes are laden with hidden presumptions,
authentication rules, privileges, hearsay exceptions, and rules of
relevance. Even if statutory clean-up legislation accompanies the
promulgation of rules, it is impossible to catch everything. If the
rules are to work as a coherent whole, the supersession power is
323. See, e.g., A. VANDERBILT, supra note 265, at 136-39; Report of the Commit-
tee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 39 A.B.A. REP. 571, 572 (1914); Wigmore, All
Legislative Rules for Judiciaty Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276,
279 (1928); Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-making Powers, 1 Mo. L. REV. 261, 263-
65 (1936).
324. See, e.g., Federal Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)); ALA. CODE § 12-2-2 (1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10-11, §§ 10:361, 10:561, 11:5122 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 477:010
(Vernon 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 751.12
(West 1981). See also OHIO CONST. art. iv, § 5(B). Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
406 (1980).
325. See Columbia Lumber & Millwork, Co. v. DeStefano, 12 NJ. 117, 95
A.2d 914 (1953); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 NJ. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340
U.S. 877 (1950). For citations to related cases, see Dooley, supra note 265, at
243-44 nn.171-72.
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necessary.326
But what if the conflict is the result of a legislative act inten-
tionally designed to alter the effect of a previously adopted rule?
Although some state courts have asserted that the rulemaking
power is exclusive to the judiciary, most recognize a concurrent
legislative power to revise rules.3 2 7 Even in such cases, however,
the courts should have the power to supersede legislation in the
area of evidentiary rules. While such a power presents the risk of
a running battle between these two branches of government, it is
more likely that the threat of such discord will compel coopera-
tion and the constructive sharing of power. Moreover, when in-
consistent provisions do emerge, the judiciary, which has control
of the whole body of rules, is in the best position to reconcile the
conflict by promulgating a new rule that harmonizes the
situation.3 28
b. Legislative Power to Initiate Evidentiary Statutes;
Savings Clauses
Some courts have found that inherent or express judicial
rulemaking power, if it is not exclusive to the judiciary, at least
confines the power of the legislature to the revision of previously
promulgated court rules.3 29 In fact, a legislative power to initiate
procedural enactments is necessary. There are areas where the
judicially adopted rules do not apply or where legislation can be
complementary. When the legislature acts in an area already cov-
ered by judicial rules, however, it should be understood as chang-
ing the effect of a rule only if an intention to supersede the
judicial rule is made express. The best hope for effective comity
and cooperation is a situation in which legislative power is recog-
326. See generally 1 R. FIELD, V. McKusIcK & L.K. WROTH, MAINE CIVIL
PRACTICE § 1.3 (2d ed. 1970); Dooley, supra note 265, at 244-45. In a series of
six clean-up bills drafted for enactment in Vermont by Mr. Dooley and Peter
Bluhm of the State Legislative Council, with the assistance of the present author,
155 statutory provisions concerning presumptions, hearsay exceptions, authen-
tication, expert witnesses, and other evidentiary matters were proposed to be
repealed or amended for consistency with the Vermont Rules of Evidence. The
comprehensive statutory review also revealed many evidentiary provisions re-
quiring no change. See H. 328 (Vt. 1983) (basic conformity); H. 563 (Vt. 1983)
(experts); H. 564 (Vt. 1984) (hearsay); H. 565 (Vt. 1984) (presumptions); H. 566
(Vt. 1984) (privileges); H. 567 (Vt. 1984) (miscellaneous). At present writing,
none of these bills has been enacted.
327. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 77-84.
328. See Dooley, supra note 265, at 245-47.
329. See Market v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
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nized, but is carefully used to avoid conflict.330
The Federal Rules and state rules based on them do not
cover the entire law of evidence. Thus, many statutory provisions
dealing with specific points or omitted provisions must remain in
effect. The Federal Rules and various state rules recognize this
practical reality by including saving clauses in particular rules
where statutes remain in force 331 and by specifically providing in
some cases for interplay of statutory provisions with the rules. s 32
3. Rulemaking and Legislative Procedure
The courts have devised a variety of methods for developing
and promulgating rules. 333 Increasingly, as exercises of the
rulemaking power have come to impinge on areas previously
within the legislative domain, concern has been expressed about
lack of visibility and public access and participation in judicial
rulemaking.3 34 If the courts are to maintain credibility in the ex-
ercise of the rulemaking power, their rulemaking procedures
must be formalized and open. At the same time, if the legislature
wishes to have a formal and effective role in the process, it should
330. See 1 R. FIELD, V. McKusICK & L.K. WROTH, supra note 326, § 1.3; J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 17-20, 77-84; Dooley, supra note 265, at 247-49.
331. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301, 402, 501, 802, 1002; N.H. R. EvID. 601;
ME. R. EVID. 303, 903.
332. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(10), 902(10). See also VT. R. EvID. 501(b)
(added effective March 7, 1985). The rule provides:
(b) Statutory Privileges. This subdivision applies to information
which is protected by a statutory privilege and which: (1) was collected
or recorded under a statute, rule or order requiring a report, disclosure
or communication to a public agency, officer or employee; (2) was col-
lected or recorded by a public agency, officer or employee in order to
provide treatment or services to the privilege holder or to determine
whether to charge the privilege holder with a crime or delinquent act;
or (3) was communicated to a mediator, factfinder or arbitrator during
a labor dispute or negotiation. The public agency, officer or employee
or the mediator, factfinder or arbitrator who holds the information is
presumed to have the authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the
person privileged. Unless the statute provides to the contrary, the priv-
ilege does not extend to original information, documents or records
when sought from original sources. No privilege exists in actions in-
volving perjury, false statements, fraud in a return or report, or other
failure to comply with the statute, rule or order in question. Rules 510
through 512 shall apply to privileges covered by this subdivision.
Id.
333. See generally J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 18-19, 84-87; Dooley,
supra note 258, at 249-50 (arguing that rulemaking procedure, up to the point of
promulgation of the rules, is not subject to legislative control as a matter of
inherent judicial power); Parness & Korbakes, A Study of the Procedural
Rulemaking Power in the United States (Am. Jud. Soc'y mimeo 1973).
334. SeeJ. WEINSTEIN, supra note 265, at 8-11, 89-104.
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develop a review procedure that works promptly and with appro-
priate regard for judicial prerogatives.33 5
B. Model Guidelines for Evidentiary Rulemaking
With the preceding concerns in mind, we now articulate
model guidelines for evidentiary rulemaking that set forth the
proper scope of the rulemaking power over evidence and the ap-
propriate means for its exercise.
1. Scope of the Rulemaking Power
The judiciary may freely adopt and amend rules of evidence
that serve interests intrinsic to the judicial process. Conversely,
the judiciary should not adopt or amend rules of evidence that
break new ground in areas that predominantly serve interests,
and are based on policies, extrinsic to the judicial process. In the
interests of uniformity and comprehensiveness, however, the ju-
diciary may adopt rules of evidence that codify the existing statu-
tory and common-law doctrine in extrinsic policy areas. Where a
rule of evidence equally serves intrinsic judicial interests and ex-
trinsic social policies, the judiciary may freely adopt it or amend it
in the absence of any clear legislative provision or common-law
rule expressly furthering the extrinsic policy.
These principles have the following particular applications in
areas that have caused difficulty in the past:
a. Presumptions
The judiciary may adopt rules that create presumptions
which have the predominant purpose of allocating burdens in
ways that aid the conduct of litigation. The judiciary may not
adopt rules that create presumptions which have the predominant
purpose of furthering extrinsic social policies. Such rules should
be left to the legislature or the common law. The judiciary may
adopt general rules describing the effect of presumptions, but it
should make clear that those rules are subject to any statutory
provision or common-law rule that may assign a different effect to
a particular presumption in order to serve an extrinsic policy.
b. Relevance Rules
The judiciary may adopt or amend special rules of relevance
335. See id. at 105-17, 147-53; Dooley, supra note 265, at 250-52; Parness &
Manthey, Public Process and StateJudicial Rulemaking, 1 PACE L. REV. 121 (1980).
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reflecting concern for the probative value or prejudicial effect of
particular types of evidence, even if such rules also further an ex-
trinsic policy. If the extrinsic policy is a generic social one, how-
ever, the judiciary should not adopt a rule that is contrary to an
express statutory provision or common-law rule.
c. Privileges
The judiciary may codify existing statutory or common-law
rules of privilege in the form and conceptual framework of rules
of evidence, provided none of the codified rules is inconsistent
with the current interpretation of an express statutory provision
or common-law rule. The judiciary may not adopt new privileges
by rule, but may codify newly developed legislative privileges and
may develop new privileges at common law in the light of reason
and experience, and may codify them in the rules. The judiciary
also may provide by rule a procedural framework for the applica-
tion of existing and newly created statutory or common-law
privileges.
d. Competency Rules
The judiciary may freely adopt or amend rules of competency
that are necessary to serve the intrinsic judicial interest in giving
the jury maximum access to evidence that is probative and not
misleading or prejudicial.
2. Accommodation of Judicial and Legislative Power
In adopting rules of evidence, the judiciary and the legisla-
ture should work together to achieve the maximum degree of co-
operation and comity through the devices set forth below.
a. Statutory Supersession and Clean-up
In areas that are properly within the judicial rulemaking
power as set out above in guideline 1 (Scope of the Rulemaking
Power), the judiciary and legislature should agree that duly
adopted rules supersede inconsistent statutes. Thus, a general
rule of competence will supersede a dead man's statute. To avoid
confusion and unnecessary conflict about the superseding effect
of any judicial promulgation or amendment of the rules of evi-
dence, the judiciary should prepare, and the legislature should
enact, a statutory clean-up measure, repealing or modifying as
necessary all inconsistent statutory provisions. If such a measure
is enacted, the supersession power need only be used to correct
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inadvertent oversights in the clean-up process and as a reserved
judicial power in the unfortunate and unlikely event of an un-
resolvable conflict between a court rule and a subsequent legisla-
tive enactment.
b. Legislative Recognition of Rulemaking Power
The legislature can assist the judiciary in fashioning and
maintaining a coherent body of rules by refraining from tinkering
with the rules as promulgated, and by expressing its initiatives on
evidentiary matters clearly but in general terms, expressly leaving
questions of implementation and effect to judicial rulemaking.
An example of such legislation might be: "Communications be-
tween law professors and law review editors are privileged from
disclosure in all proceedings to which the Rules of Evidence ap-
ply, on such terms and conditions as the Supreme Court may by
rule provide."
c. Saving Clauses in Rules
The judiciary may find it necessary or desirable to defer to
the legislature, as in the case of presumptions and privileges. In
such a case, to make clear that relevant statutes are not super-
seded, the appropriate rules should contain saving clauses pro-
viding that the rules govern "except as otherwise provided by
statute." Such saving clauses may be accompanied where appro-
priate by provisions intended to describe the procedural imple-
mentation or evidentiary effect of statutory rules.
3. Rulemaking and Legislative Procedure
The preceding accommodative measures can work most ef-
fectively in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. The judiciary
and legislature should work together to establish a rulemaking
process open to all interested parties. The judiciary's procedures
should provide not only public notice and opportunity for com-
ment, but an express invitation to members or staff of the legisla-
ture to comment and participate at the drafting stage. The
legislature should formalize its review process, providing that the
rules take effect in the absence of legislative objection within a
stated time period, and that the form of any legislative objection
should be a resubmission to the court with a statement detailing
the reasons for the objection.
Similarly, the judiciary should participate in any legislative in-
itiative regarding evidence rules. An individual or a committee
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should be designated by the court to monitor such legislative ac-
tivity, maintain liaison with appropriate legislative committees
and staff, and participate both formally and informally in the leg-
islative drafting and hearing process.
V. CONCLUSION
Uniformity between federal and state rules of evidence and
among state rules is in fact a blend of uniformity in form and con-
cept with variation in detail reflective of local practice or condi-
tions. The advantages of uniformity to both practitioners and
scholars are manifest, and its continued development should be
encouraged.
Rules of evidence preferably should be developed by the pro-
mulgation of court rules under the judicial rulemaking power.
This method provides the maximum of expertise, coherence, and
flexibility in the adoption and amendment of the rules.
While judicial rulemaking power over matters intrinsic to the
trial process is inherent, the judiciary and legislature must recog-
nize their concurrent roles in the codification and development of
the law of evidence. Through use of various accommodative de-
vices, conflict may be avoided and a body of rules of evidence may
be cooperatively developed to serve both the interests of the judi-
ciary in fair and efficient conduct of the judicial process, and the
interests of the legislature in furthering the manifold interests of
its constituents.
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